By John Turney
When Dan Hampton was elected to the Pro Football Hall of Fame in 2002, the argument against him was familiar. Hampton had been one of the most dominant defensive linemen of his generation, but he had also missed significant stretches of his career. For a defensive lineman in an era when longevity was often treated as an unofficial prerequisite for Canton, 157 games over 12 seasons—and roughly two dozen missed because of injury—gave voters something to consider.
The criticism, however, tended to focus on what Hampton did not play rather than on what happened when he did. That is where Hall-of-Fame voter and Hampton's presenter Don Pierson’s presentation became particularly interesting.
Pierson had obtained research that went beyond Hampton’s individual statistics and examined separating their performance in games Hampton played from those he missed. It was not a perfect experiment, of course, but it was useful. Useful, that is a term Paul Zimmerman would often use when referring to statistics. Some were; many were not.
Of course, players do not miss games randomly, and injuries can affect the entire team. The circumstances surrounding a game, the quality of the opponent, and the availability of other players all matter. "With Hampton" and "without Hampton" cannot, by themselves, establish causation.
But the numbers were striking enough to make the point. From 1983 through 1990, the Bears won 75 percent of the games Hampton played and only 33 percent of the games he missed. The difference was not confined to the scoreboard.
Chicago averaged 3.6 sacks per game with Hampton in the lineup, compared with 2.3 without him.
More dramatically, the Bears defense allowed only 14 points per game when Hampton played and 23 when he did not. At Hampton's Hall of Fame induction, Bears legend Ed O’Bradovich pointed out that the Bears’ defense improved dramatically with Hampton in the lineup in all 20 statistical categories that were included in Pierson's presentation.
That is the part of Hampton’s résumé that can get lost when the discussion becomes a simple accounting of games played (and sack totals). Pierson later said the statistics helped in the induction of Dan Hampton.
The Dan Hampton Effect was real enough to show up on the scoreboard.
Howie Long offers a useful contrast. Over his Raiders career, the win percentage dipped only modestly when he was out (roughly 59 percent with him, 52 percent without). Rushing yards allowed rose from about 110 to 126 per game and yards per carry from 3.7 to 4.2. Sacks fell slightly from 3.2 to 2.8 per game. There was a measurable Long Effect, but the defense did not collapse. The supporting pieces around him—Alzado, Townsend, Pickel and others—kept the unit functional. Long was elite; the room around him was deep enough that his absences did not quite produce the same cliff.
Future Hall-of-Famer J.J. Watt supplies a modern data set that sits between the two. He won't need this kind of analytics to justify his induction; his All-Pro and Defensive Player of theYear credientials will zoom Watt into Canton on his first try when his time comes.
However, he has a similar career profile as Hampton and Long in this particular regard, kind of in between the two and it's sueful to look at.
In the seasons in which Watt missed significant time (2016, 2017 and 2019 with Houston, plus 2021 with Arizona), the teams went 18-25 in the games he missed and 16-7 in the games he played during those same seasons. That is a jump from roughly 42 percent to 70 percent. And the defensive stats follow along with that trend. But to be fair, that is a slightly different analysis than what was done with Hampton and Long.
Watt's full-career sample (151 games played, 43 missed, and apples-to-apples to Hampton and Long) softens the win-percentage gap (51 percent to 42 percent), as expected because there were a few really poor teams Watt played on, but the defensive indicators still move in the same direction: points allowed drop from 25.0 per game without him to 22.0 with him, total yards allowed improve, passer rating allowed improves, and sacks rise from 1.8 to 2.5 per game.
Rushing yards allowed jumped from 102 yards a game to about 121 without him. Yards per rush allowed also was negatively affected going from 3.9 to 4.3 per attempt.
It goes on, but you get the point. And yes, the gaps are real. They are not identical in magnitude to Hampton’s, nor are they as modest as Long’s. They are large enough, consistent enough across different seasons and supporting casts, and visible enough in the categories that matter most for a disruptive defensive lineman that the measuring stick still works.
The Bears were better with Hampton than without. Same for the Raiders and Long. J.J. Watt's teams were better in terms of wins and in statistics when Watt was playing compared to when he was out injured.
Yes, J.J. Watt was a winner.
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