Building a Wall—Notable Improvements in Run Defense. Part VII

DISCUSSION
By TJ Troup and John Turney

This is part seven of a rolling conversation about teams that hard remarkable improvement in their rushing defense from one year to another.

Troup on the 1969 Vikings:
While Norm Van Brocklin put his stamp on the Vikings; there is no doubt the inconsistency and the failures in 1966 led to his leaving the organization. Street and Smith's, in their 1969 edition, states the following: "A new coach, Bud Grant, has put Minnesota on the map".

When the glamor era of Norm Van Brocklin ended in 1966, the Vikings could see they had made a lot of noise and some progress but they were ripe to go either way in National League Football." Though the first two years of Grant's leadership resulted in just 11 wins, the Norsemen are now defending Central division champs.

Grant also has a vision of how he wants his defense to play. The key addition to Minnesota is quality defensive line coach Jack Patera. He has had success working with both the Rams and Giants defensive lines, and he has a real opportunity to help Bud build something special—and the 1969 Viking defense is SOMETHING SPECIAL.

While the secondary is still rotating players, and are sure improved in zone pass defense under Bud's guidance the corners are not a key part in stopping the run. Paul Krause is asked to play deep, and is not a strong tackler, but the strong safety Karl Kassulke has grown into the position and does help on wide run plays to the tight end side of the field.

Not a lot is stated in Street & Smith's about the linebacking trio; though Wally Hilgenberg is now the full-time starter at right outside linebacker. Roy Winston is rock solid at left linebacker, and Lonnie Warwick sure does not shy away from contact. These men may not get much ink, but they perform well.

Gary Larsen is a force at left defensive tackle and is selected for the Pro Bowl. His defensive tackle companion is fast approaching stardom. Trimmed down and as such lightning-quick Alan Page can make any guard in the league looking foolish. Page is quickly learning the tricks of the trade in shedding blocks, and he is one of the best in the league in pursuit.

Lean experienced Jim Marshall holds his own against much bigger left offensive tackles, and he also is strong in pursuit and averaged more than a sack a game. Carl Eller rivals David Jones as the best left defensive end in the league. That alone tells a lot since the Deacon is two-time defensive player of the year.

In 1969 Dick Butkus was the NFL defensive player of the year but Eller was the runner-up in the voting (Deacon Jones was third) and Eller also was the runner-up for the UPI Player of the Year award and was third in the voting for the AP MVP award. All attest to the kind of year Eller had.

The legendary "Purple People Eaters" allowed 1,903 yards rushing in 1968, and though the front seven demonstrated they could get the job done; that group is far from dominant. Dominance is one of the words that can be used over and over again to describe them in 1969 as they allow only 1,089 yards rushing on 337 carries.

Known as the "Black and Blue" division due to the physicality of how this four-team division plays; it is time for some insight in a rivalry that is almost never mentioned in this era. Today in the NFL one of the most bitter rivalries is Green Bay and Minnesota. Going into 1969 the Vikings had won 5 of the 15 previous games against Green Bay. Going into 1969 the Vikings had won 5 of the previous 15 games against Detroit.

The navy blue & burnt orange Chicago Bears have lost just TWICE to the Vikings in their previous 15 games entering 1969, and more importantly, Minnesota has lost seven straight at home against Chicago. Ouch!

Grant knows that much change, and the fact that a Comet from Kansas resides in the Chicago backfield is a real challenge. Gale Sayers has made many a Viking miss him as many of his best games have come at the expense of the purple and gold. The first seven games of '69 opponents have gained 704 yards rushing (3.8 a carry), and the Vikings are 6-1.

Sayers gained just 15 yards on 13 carries as the Vikings finally beat the Bears at the Met. Sayers is one very motivated runner in the rematch at Wrigley and is the only one hundred yard rusher allowed by Minnesota in the season (he fought for every yard he gained).

Gale's longest run in the game is 24 yards, which happens to be the longest allowed by the Vikings all season. The last seven games of the year Minnesota allows just 385 yards (55 a game) on 152 carries. The NFL champions improved 814 yards in stopping the run.

Turney on the 1970 Bengals:
In 1969 the Bengals rush defense still, really, an expansion team, gave up 2,651 rushing yards for an average 5.1 yards a carry. It was one of the worst run defenses you will find in any era. In 1970 they reduced that number to 1,543 yards and a very good 3.7 yards per carry.

So, what happened? This one has some answers but not as many as some previous posts.

Tom Bass, the first coach hired by Paul Brown, was the defensive coordinator in 1969 and he resigned to go into the real estate business. He was replaced by Chuck Weber, a former NFL linebacker who picks off six passes in 1960 for the NFL Champion Eagles.

Weber didn't change the scheme, it was still Paul Brown's defense, but he did get better performance from the players, both the holdovers and the rookies.

He had a fine middle 'backer, Bill Bergey, was an AFL Defensive Rookie of the Year in 1969 and he'd remain there in 1970, as did left linebacker Al Beauchamp. Beauchamp was going into his third season in 1967. He was a good, but not spectacular, linebacker who struggled in his second year, perhaps a sophomore slump?

Ken Avery was a backup in 1969 and he took over as the starter in 1970 and the 1969 starter Bill Peterson became a backup. So while there was that change in the linebacking corps it was really the same crew, but they played better, more cohesive in 1970.

Bergey with a year under his belt didn't have a slump his second year, he was better. He flowed to the ball, read his keys and didn't miss many tackles. With the changes up front, fewer blockers were getting to him on the second level freeing his scrapes to either side.

Up front, there were two upgrades. Mike Reid took over at left tackle and Ron Carpenter became the right end. Both were rookies. The two starting defensive tackles from 1969 were traded away. Bill Staley was traded (with Harry Gunner) to the Bears for Rufus Mayes and Andy Rice was shipped to the Chargers for Gary Kirner and a pick.

Staley was a 2nd round pick for the Bengals in 1968 so unloading him after just two seasons says a lot, it clearly wasn't working out. Staley was a starter for a few years but was average at best.  Rice was a part-time starter for the Chargers and actually ended up on the Bears in 1972 with Staley. Riche had been a good pass rusher in 1968-69 (15 total sacks) but Staley didn't mount any pressure (3 sacks in 1968-69).

Steve Chomyszak was a defensive end in 1969 where he didn't have the speed needed to play well there. He was very big for his era (6-6, 265) and Weber moved him inside and matched him with Mike Reid inside. He was stout inside, kept blockers away from his knees and made tackles in the backfield. And for good measure recorded 7½ sacks to lead the team.

The left end remained the same—Royce Berry. Berry was an average player, better versus the run than the pass (21 career sacks in five starting seasons with the Bengals). When you watch Bengals film Berry is the guy who gets close to the QB but cannot close with the hit, knockdown or sack. "Warning track power", is what Jack Youngblood calls it. But he had some size (6-4, 250) and ability to hold the point of attack. So, with a new cast, he does much better as an overall defender. He recorded six sacks (a career high) and was solid enough versus the run and even picked up four fumbles and took two of them back for touchdowns.

Reid was an active, dynamic player, super-quick. He was similar to Alan Page in that respect. He did injure a knee and missed the final month of the season but his quick, penetrating style allowed for more tackles for loss for the Bengals. In nine games he recorded five sacks and had at least that many tackles for loss as well. He was key to breaking up blocking schemes and allowing the others to come in and make tackles. Not unlike Aaron Donald is now, though not to the same degree.

Ron Carpenter was more suited for tackle than end and even moved there later in his career, but when he was young he did have enough speed to be an upgrade over Chomyszak. At 261 he could hold his point but really didn't get much pass rush, but then again in 1969 Chomyszakdidn't either, so overall it was an upgrade at right end.

Nineteen seventy was not a dominant run-stopping season by the Bengals, it's not the 1976 Steelers we are posting about. They gave up 212 yards to the Redskins midseason and 191 to the Lions in week two. But, overall they allowed 110 yards per game, good for 9th in the NFL and their yards per attempt was 11th but it was a far cry from 1969 when they were last in pro football (both the AFL and NFL).

In all, it added up to a cut of 1,108 yards from 1969 to 1970 and the yards per carry was reduced from 5.1 to 3.7—not a bad improvement from one year to the next.

Building a Wall—Notable Improvements in Run Defense. Part VI

DISCUSSION
By TJ Troup and John Turney

Welcome to part six of an ongoing discussion of defenses that improved their run defense in a big way from one year to the next.

Troup on the St. Louis Cardinals of 1966:
The contending Cardinals of 1963 & '64 are predicted to finish second in the Eastern Conference in '65, and after a fast start fade badly to finish 5-9. The opening statement for '65 in Street & Smiths is as follows: "Splendid balance both on offense and defense, plus capable depth at every position, has been the trademark of teams coached by Wally Lemm in the last three years."

The Cardinals defensive depth in 1965 was just not there, so let's take a quick look at the write-up in 1966 Street & Smiths shall we? "Too many times the Cardinals have been over-rated. Yes, they some very good players, but they also have some ordinary players."

Charley Winner leaves the Colts were he served a long successful apprenticeship and this is his first chance to be a head coach. The line-up is much the same up front with one notable exception, and he is one of the reasons for the Cardinals success in stopping the run.

Chuck Walker is undeniably the most impressive new starting defensive tackle in the league and earns a Pro Bowl berth. He is strong, quick for his size, and sheds blocks very well at his right defensive tackle post. Sam Silas had gone to the Pro Bowl after the '65 campaign, and he is adequate in '66, and since he is just not the same player----rookie Dave Long gets plenty of playing time.

Don Brumm gives a strong effort at right defensive end, and Joe Robb at left defensive end heads to Los Angeles for the Pro Bowl for his performance in '66.

Larry Stallings at left outside linebacker and Bill Koman at right outside linebacker continue to play solid football, while Dale Meinert a pro bowl selection in '65 is even better in 1966, yet he does not earn another ticket to LA?

Meinert fills all the gaps and still is a strong tackler. The veteran might not be the fastest, but that is not a factor on wide run plays do to the expertise of the two starting safeties.

Jerry Stovall missed some playing time in '65 due to injury, but he is an every down player in '66 and he also heads to Los Angeles for the Pro Bowl. He plays the wide side run very well. Larry Wilson in his seventh season has the experience, savvy, and attitude needed to be the premier run-stopping free safety. Everyone noted his incredible courage in '65 when he played game-changing football against Pittsburgh with two broken hands. The square-jawed lean defender from Utah missed the final four games of the '65 campaign (Cardinals lost them all).

So much has been written about his pass defense feats in '66 yet he also played the run with savage effectiveness. He is always in position to make the tackle. Six weeks into the season the Cardinals are undefeated and have allowed 626 yards rushing.

One of the victories is over the Browns in Cleveland and this is the only game where the Cardinal defenders struggle. LeRoy Kelly gains over 100 yards rushing, but the Cardinals score 34 to win.

Film study shows that Dick Schafrath had an outstanding day against Don Brumm, and Kelly ran more plays to the left side. His biggest gain, however, is on a sweep right with the guard pulling. Kelly darts inside the block and makes Stallings, Stovall, Fischer, and Wilson miss—then jets off to score on a 57-yard touchdown run.

Issues on offense cost the Cardinals the division title as they go 3-5 the last eight games of the season, but the St. Louis run defense was even better the down the stretch as opponents gained just 566 yards (70 a game) on 205 carries, and as such the Cardinals improve by 621 yards in run defense.

Turney on the 1989 Broncos:
From 1974-83 the Broncos defense, led by Randy Gradishar (the 1978 Defensive Player of the Year), allowed just 3.6 yards per such during that span. From 1984-88 they allowed 4.2 yards a carry more than a one-half yard per rush more with a high of 4.6 allowed in 1988 (2,538 yards rushing allowed, worst in team history).

Even though the Broncos made it to the Super Bowl in 1987 the run defense was known as 'soft'. In 1986 was good, though, but that was the exception not the rule for 1985-88.

In 1989 it had to change.

The first step was Dan Reeves let Joe Collier, the Broncos long-term defensive coordinator go and hired Wade Phillips. Phillips ran a 3-4 like Collier but he was known for more blitzing and a more aggressive style.

In 1988 Karl Mecklenburg missed almost half the season, so that didn't help. He was healthy in 1989 and played well enough to be All-Pro (after missing it the previous two seasons). In 1989 he was the weakside (MO) linebacker for Phillips. Previously, for Collier, he was the strong side inside 'backer in their base defense and then he would rush from the right end or sometimes right tackle in pass defense schemes.

The weak outside linebacker was Simon Fletcher. Like Mecklenburg, he moved from the strong to the weak side in 1989. He was never known as a run stopper, but he had good movement as was an excellent pass rusher (he'd usually play left defensive end in passing situations and Mecklenburg would usually play right defensive end in those situations). So, a move to the weak side made sense for Phillips.

Rick Dennison and Jim Ryan were the weak side of the linebacking corps in 1988 and they were average if that. They were smart and active but undersized. Ryan was around 220, he may have been the smallest outside linebacker in the NFL in the 1980s. He also was the Bronco signal caller after Gradishar retired until he retired himself.

Dennison held onto his job in 1989 and did play better than he did in 1988. In 1989 he played the strong side when Mecklenburg was out and moved back to the weak ILB spot after that, so he did play both inside 'backer spots.

Ryan was out of the NFL in 1989 and was replaced by Michael Brooks in the lineup but on the opposite side as Ryan. Brooks was a Bronco backup for a couple of years as he was healing up from a college knee injury and he was ready to roll as a starter in 1989. Phillips inserted him into strongside outside linebacker position. Brooks was very dynamic and had terrific range and was a very good tackler. He was a big upgrade over Ryan.

Together the linebackers flowed to the ball as the linemen would sometimes two-gap but more often would slant and stunt to confuse the blocking scheme. Phillips made up for a lack of size up front by using movement, something he still does to this day.

Speaking of the linemen—Walt Bowyer was the left end in 1988 and he was essentially a career backup and became the starter by attrition. At the nose, they had Greg Kragen who was a smaller, active-type nose, not a big bruiser. He relied on stunts and movement to make plays and he could do it fairly well. He'd become the starter in 1986 and was getting better, but if teams ran right at him, he could be moved and teams could get yards.

Andre Townsend, like Kragen, kept his job from 1988 to 1989, at least for a while. He was solid at best but benefitted from the Phillips defense. Bowyer didn't. He was better against the run that the pass. Ron Holmes was nicked up early in the season. The Broncos traded a fourth-round pick to the Buccaneers for Holmes (where he'd been a disappointment as a first-rounder in 1984) Holmes finished the least at right end and played the best football of his career in that stretch. He would sink to right defensive tackle in the sub (nickel, dime, 7-DB) schemes.

Another disappointing 1984 first-round pick was acquired by the Broncos via Plan B free agency. It was Alphonso Carreker, a 6-6, 270-pound player, who was often nicked by injuries with the Packers who drafted him. However, he was able to stop the run with healthy, using long arms and reach to fend off blockers. In 1989 he was the left end for the Broncos and would play inside in nickel/dime, rushing as a defensive tackle like Holmes did.

Last but not least, not the least by a long shot was the addition of rookie Steve Atwater. Atwater was the free safety and Dennis Smith was the strong safety, though they both played both techniques.

Atwater was 6-3, 220, and was a vicious hitter and tackler. He played closer to the line of scrimmage as much (if not more) than any free safety in the NFL in help in run support. Smith was a better athlete, he was 6-3, 205, and even though he was 30, he could still run. He was a great tackler and also a major hitter.

Left corner Tyrone Braxton took over at left corner for Mark Haynes who became the nickle (essentially these two swapped positions). Braxton was a smaller (5-11, 185) corner but was fiesty and would come up in "cloud" coverages and support the run in the tradition of Gary Green and Pat Thomas).

In the first seven games of the season, this new iteration of the Broncos defense allowed just 89.2 yards rushing a game. Then, in week eight, the Eagles (Phillips' former team) hung 215 yards on them, though Randall Cunningham had something to do with that.

The last eight games they rebounded to allow just 92.5 yards a game and the season total was 98.8.

In all, the Broncos cut 958 yards off their 1988 total (from 2,538 to 1,580) and the average dropped from 4.6 to 3.7. Sacks also went up and pass defensive improved as well and points allowed were cut from 352 to 226.

The Broncos made it to the Super Bowl and got blown out, it's true but the accomplishment of cutting nearly 1,000 rushing from the run defense is no small matter, one of the best improvements ever and Wade Phillips and Atwater and Brooks and Mecklenburg deserve credit for it.

Next up part VII

Building a Wall—Notable Improvements in Run Defense. Part V

DISCUSSION
By TJ Troup and John Turney

This is part five of our serious on teams who stepped up their run defense from one year to another.

Troup on the '63 Raiders:
Researching a team for a single season without the benefit of a ton of film to digest is a real challenge, yet the 1963 Oakland Raiders are sure worth the time and effort. Just wish I had more film of them from both the disaster of 1962 and the amazing success story of '63. This narrative is dedicated to two loyal and steadfast Raider fans in John Richards (PFRA member and distinguished artist) & Chris Barlow (of NFL Films).

The 1962 Raiders allowed 2,440 yards rushing, and in their only victory they allowed just 82; thus an average of 173 yards a game in those thirteen losses. Al Davis must address both the challenges of putting together a staff and re-vitalizing the roster. Bill Wise in the Pro Football Almanac states "perhaps the best endorsement for the AFL is how Oakland can look forward to the future with vi-gah.

Their existence defies the economic tenets of Adam Smith. The Raiders have been for three years the poor orphans of the Bay area, playing most recently in a makeshift stadium, with makeshift players under makeshift coaching". Al Davis in his maiden voyage as a head coach at the pro level is not MAKESHIFT.

He has a vision, and one of the key components is having men who can teach—thus enter Tom Dahms who had played with distinction as an offensive lineman with the Los Angeles Rams. Dahms takes on the task of rebuilding and teaching the defensive line.

Dalva Allen and Jon Jelacic return as the defensive ends but switch sides with Allen playing so well at left defensive end he receives All-Pro mention. The rangy duo hold their own against drive blocks and are able in pursuit.

Chuck McMurtry plays both tackle posts, yet more at left d-tackle. Rookie Dave Costa is in consideration for rookie of the year, and also plays both spots. Their back-up who receives plenty of playing time is Jim Norris. All three men are strong factors in stopping the run.

Davis knew how the linebacker position is to be played by watching Faulkner and Noll teach the Charger linebackers. The issue is simple; mobility. Bob Dougherty starts the beginning of the year at left linebacker as he has the past three years, yet he is replaced by former middle linebacker Jackie Simpson. Exhibiting toughness and tackling ability Simpson is a marked improvement.

Davis made waves in trading for Art Powell, yet his trade for former all-league middle linebacker Archie Matsos is the key to the season. Undersized (6-0, 217), yet quick, savvy, and a can't miss open field tackler who thrives on being in the right place the right time Archie is chosen First-team All-AFL.

Clancy Osborne could not keep a starting outside linebacker job with either the 49ers or Vikings, but he sure does the job for Oakland. His pursuit skills are a key factor in stopping the run all year. No one except Davis believed Osborne could do the job, and Clancy sure does. Osborne is backed up by undersized Charlie Rieves. The second-year man gets plenty of playing time, and he also is quick, and a fine tackler.

Tommy Morrow at right safety sets a pro football record that still stands as he intercepts in eight consecutive games. His forte is pass defense, yet he is an able tackler. Since Morrow is not near the factor in run defense; the left safety must be, and Mr. Davis acquires former Redskin Joe Krakoski. He plays so well he receives some All-AFL recognition as he plays the strong side sweep as well as anyone in the AFL.

The left corner is consensus All-AFL Fred Williamson, and he is not only a fine pass defender, he believes he is the "Hammer" in stopping the man with the ball in his tracks.

Six games into the year the Raiders are 2-4, but in the loss to the Jets is one of the key plays of the year. New York has the ball on the Raider thirty-seven on 4th and 2 to go. Simpson and Matsos stop the run and give the Raiders a chance in the 10-7 loss. This would have never happened in 1962. Oakland wins four straight, and to a man the Raiders not only know they will record a winning season, they believe they can catch the Chargers and win the west.

On the road in Denver Costa & McMurtry cause a fumble that Jelacic scoops up and runs 19 yards for a touchdown. The Raider run defense not only stops the run (17 Bronco first-half rushing yards, and only 12 second-half rushing yards), they score also. Oakland will finish the year at home for the final three games, and the first opponent is San Diego.

Paul Lowe is a 1,000-yard rusher for the season, but today he carries 4 times for zero yards in the first half and gains 5 yards on 2 carries in the 2nd half. None the less San Diego has built up a 27-10 lead until the Raiders score 31 unanswered to win. Oakland closes out the year with two more wins to finish 10-4. The Raiders allowed 1,488 yards rushing in '63 (an improvement of a whopping 952 yards) and they cut the yards per carry from 5.1 to 4.0. Each year the Silver & Black improve to become a dominant AFL team by the end of the decade.

Turney on the '81 Giants:
Sometimes the answer for dramatic improvement is obvious. The 1981 Giants are such an example. In 1980 the Giants allowed 2,507 rushing yards (4.3 avg) and 31 rushing touchdowns. That's the very definition of a sieve.

The defensive coordinator was Ralph Hawkins who had played in the NFL and coached in the AFL before working for George Allen from 1971-77 and became the coordinator for the Giants in 1979 and immediately converted the Giants from a 4-3 scheme to a 3-4.  He and Ray Perkins (not sure which—or both?) hired a young assistant from who was in Denver in 1978 named Bill Belichick to coach the linebackers.

That first year, 1979, the run defense marginally improved. Harry Carson had perhaps his best-ever season and Brad Van Pelt transition from a SAM in a 4-3 to a solid strong-side 3-4 'backer.

John Mendenhall gave the nose the old college try but was not suited for a 3-4 scheme and in 1980 was replaced by a powerhouse rookie named Curtis McGriff. However, for whatever reason, the run defense got worse in 1980 with McGriff in the middle.

Harry Carson missed eight games, six in the middle of the season and then the final two games and  Joe McLaughlin stepped in for him and he was average at best. So Carson being out was a big part of the issue in 1980, but not the only one.

Brian Kelly was 6-3, 230 and also was hurt and missed all but two games. He'd been solid for years on the Giants defense as both an outside and middle linebacker.  He was replaced by John Skorupan a former Bill who was tough but lacked any kind of athleticism in 1980 (his last in the NFL).

The left inside backer in 1979 was Dan Lloyd who was diagnosed in March of 1980 with cancer of the lymph nodes. He'd begun treatment for it and was out of football indefinitely. (He did try to come back in the USFL in 1983 after being declared cured by doctors and he's alive and well today).

His replacement was Frank Marion who was essentially a career backup. And he got injured. So did McLaughlin and Skorupan.

So, the replacements for injured players were being replaced.  In all five rookies started a total of 16 games for the Giants in 1980. Names like Mike Whittington, Kervin Wyatt, Kevin Turner, Phil Cancik, and Ben Apuna were showing up in the starting lineups. Wyatt and Apuna never played in the NFL after 1980. Turner's only NFL start was with the Giants in 1980, two of the three NFL starts Cancik came in 1980 and all seven of Whittington's NFL career NFL starts came that year.

Someone may need to ask Bill Belichick if 1980 was his biggest NFL challenge. We would but getting access for mainstream writers is tough enough. As a blogger, it's even harder than that but we'd love to ask Bill B. about what he and Coordinator Hawkins had to do toe even field a linebacking corps that year.

The bigger question is how they even competed at all late in the season and why the defensive rushing numbers were not worse. The Giants allowed only 55 more rushing yards in 1980 than they did in 1979 when everyone was healthy. To be fair, though, they did allow more than double the rushing touchdowns and the rushing yards per attempt went from 4.0 to 4.3, an increase, but not terrible given the circumstances.

Fairly or not, Hawkins was dismissed and the Giants brought in a young linebackers coach from the Patriots named Bill Parcells to run the defense. He wisely keeps Bill Belichick as his right-hand man and linebackers coach.

To their infinite wisdom, they drafted Lawrence Taylor with the second pick of the 1981 NFL draft and installed him at the right outside linebacker position. A healthy Brian Kelly was moved to inside linebacker and Carson stayed healthy all season. That crew became known as the "Crunch Bunch"

On the line, Curtis McGriff moved to left end and began his reign as one of the best-ever two-gap ends ever. He couldn't rush the passer to save his life but he couldn't be moved and wasn't going to be run at. The previous starter, George Martin, became a third-down rusher and logged about 10 sacks (though he did start late in the season when Gary Jeter went down).

Bill Neill was a rookie out of Pitt and he won the nose tackle position and did well (he was backed up by Jim Burt who got some snaps) as did Phil Tabor pretty good backup lineman would could play on the nose or end or even as a tackle in the 40 nickel when they tried that.

Parcells also made another key move. Beasley Reece had been the Giants strong safety for a few years and was pretty good. Parcells, though, wanted a more stout strong sider so he brought in Bill Currier to play there and moved Reece to free safety.

Currier was a starter in Houston for Bum Phillips and was certainly no star but he could tackle and had smarts. He'd lost his job to a more athletic player, Vernon Perry, and then he went to the Patriots in 1980, where Parcells was coaching the linebackers. Currier was a solid special teams player but couldn't compete for playing with the Patriots troika of safeties—all of whom were all excellent.

With the Crunch Bunch linebacking, McGriff and Neill toiling on the line and "yak strong" Jeter, and solid tackler Bill Currier all relatively healthy the Giants cut 616 yards from their 1980 total (to 1,891 yards) and cut the yards per attempt from 4.3 to 3.4 and the 31 touchdowns allowed in 1980 was cut to 10 and the Giants and with the help of AP Defensive Player of the Year Lawrence Taylor their increased their sacks from 28 to 44. Most importantly (remember Bill Belichick cares about points, not yards) the Giants allowed 168 fewer points (425 to 257) in 1981 than the previous season.

Certainly, the excellent up front helped the secondary (Mark Haynes went from an average rookie to an All-Pro second-year player) as the Giants cut their defensive passer rating 81.4 to 68.1.


Next up: Part VI.

Building a Wall—Notable Improvements in Run Defense. Part IV

DISCUSSION
By TJ Troup and John Turney

Welcome to the fourth discussion of improved run defenses.

TJ Troup on the 1960 Cardinals:
Next saga the improvement of the Cardinals from '59 to '60.

Here we go . . . The Chicago Cardinals rarely played strong defense during the decade of the 1950's, yet during the woeful 1959 season, there was an improvement on the defensive side of the ball.

Moving south to St. Louis for 1960 there will not be many changes overall to the personnel, yet a dramatic improvement as the Cardinals lead the league in defense overall and post a winning season.

Let's take a closer look, shall we?

Don Owens replaces Culpepper at d-tackle and plays stout football, while the transition to replace Carl Brettschneider at left linebacker is filled by young Ted Bates (he proved he was not a middle linebacker in '59). Frank Fuller plays outstanding at right defensive tackle, while Luke Owens is a load to block at right defensive end.

Dale Meinert is the main reason St. Louis is so much improved in stopping the run as he plays like he was born to play the position of middle linebacker.  He's strong at the point of attack, and excellent at scraping the "C" gap—he is also rock solid in pursuit.

There are websites and books that have attempted to list the starters for teams, and all of them that have tried to list the starters for the decade of the 1960s have failed. Pro Football Reference for the '59 Cardinals has Night Train Lane at left corner (this is correct), and newcomer Jerry Norton at right corner.

Norton started the first three games of '59 at right safety, then had a Pro Bowl season as the left safety. John Roach is listed as the starter at left safety, and he did start the first three games, then rarely sees the field—oops? And DOUBLE OOPS! The starting right corner is quick tough Jimmy Hill (he is not listed by the site?), while Billy Stacy starts most of the year at right safety which is listed correctly.

Hill returns to his right corner post in '60, and Stacy is the nominal starter at left corner with the trade of Lane to Detroit. Run support from the safety post is paramount in strong successful run defense, and the Cardinals have Norton in his All-Pro year at left safety, and rookie Larry Wilson at right safety.

Even as a rookie Wilson demonstrated that he was gonna be a factor in stopping the run. Fearless, tough, and a fierce tackler—he and Meinert are the keys to success in 1960. The Cardinals could not beat Cleveland as the Browns gained 305 yards. The man himself Jim Brown pounded out 305 of those yards on 52 attempts to move the chains and keep the ball.

That said—St. Louis allowed just 792 yards rushing in the other ten games they played. 1959 Chicago allowed 1,874 yards rushing, but in 1960 the St. Louis Cardinals allowed just 1,212 yards (662 yards better than the previous season) in their 4-3 defense.

Turney on the 1974 Patriots:
Chuck Fairbanks was hired as the Patriots in 1973 as their head coach, he'd been a great NCAA coach at  Oklahoma winning three Big 8 championships. A more modern comparison might be that of Jimmy Johnson who was hired to be the Dallas Cowboys head coach in 1989. The comparison is that they both brought college defensive schemes to the NFL that became en vogue shortly thereafter and they both knew the college game, it's players and how to draft well.

Johnson brought the "Miami 4-3" to the NFL a scheme that often stacks all three linebackers and uses over and under fronts. Though there were elements of that in the NFL before Johnson, after the Cowboys success in 1992 and 1993 they were adopted all over the NFL.

Fairbanks in his first draft selected John Hannah, Sam Cunningham, Ray Hamilton, and Darryl Stingley all excellent with Hannah being awesome. So, like Johnson, he knew talent.

Fairbanks, in 1973, wanted to run the 3-4 or "Okie" defense. It had been run in the NFL, particularly the AFL for a while but no one committed to it as their usual base defense, it was more like a changeup or situational defense for most, if not all teams. Some did use it more than others like the mid-1960s Bills and Chargers and Chiefs and others.

In 1973 Fairbanks ran it some but didn't have the personnel to do it fulltime in that initial season. He tried to get Rich Jackson to please come to Boston and play nose tackle for him. Jackson's knees were shot but his power and strength were not. So, his days as a defensive end were over but Fairbanks knew Jackson could be a great nose. Jackson agreed and said he'd play for Fairbanks if he could do it as a player-coach. Jackson was an education major in college and was ready to get on to the next phase of his life, even if it meant playing a few years more in the NFL.

Fairbanks didn't want to do it that way so no deal was struck. So, in 1973, without the foundational piece he needed the Patriots played the 4-3 defense.

The Pats run defense was bad in 1972 (2717 yards and a 5.0 yards per carry average) and a bit worse in 1973 (2,850 and a 5.1 average). Fairbanks would watch the films with his defensive coaches and marvel how bad Rick Cash was at right defensive end. Fairbanks had to replace him.

At the left end was promising rookie Ray Hamilton who was too short for end, but and too small for a 4-3 tackle. One tackle was Dave Rowe who should have been a better run stuffer due to his being 6-7 and 290 or so pounds. Julius Adams had shown promise in 1971 but kept getting moved from tackle to end to tackle and regressed from his rookie season.

Steve Kiner was a solid athlete but just didn't play well in 1973. He was excellent in 1971 but then got hurt and missed the 1972 season and he just wasn't up to snuff in '73 possibly due to not being 100% physically.

The Mike 'backer in 1973 was Edgar Chandler a journeyman at best. And at weak 'backer Ron Acks roamed. Acks was 6-2 and listed at 214 but that was probably with a 5-lb weight on his jock. he was just too small to start in the NFL because he didn't have the compensatory speed to make up for it.

So that was the from seven crew that played the Patriots 4-3 defense in 1973.

So, in 1974 Fairbanks begins his drive to run the 3-4 defense. He drafted Steve Nelson and Sam Hunt two collegians who knew how to play the Okie. Edgar Chandler is now out of the NFL though he found work in the WFL.

Nelson missed some time due to injury buy was still All-Rookie and made 77 tackles. Sam Hunt, a short, stout (6-1, 245) linebacker was excellent, filling holes and even picking off three passes. Not bad for someone who was not always on the field on passing downs and a 15th round "hunch".

Kiner is traded to Houston (where he regains his abilities and starts for several years as an ILBer for them). To replace him the Patriots send a late-round draft pick to the Steelers for George Webster.

Webster was a dominant outside linebacker for the Oilers in the late-1960s before he blew out a knee. He was compared to Bobby Bell. However, he never recovered to his previous self after that. In 1972 the Steelers took a flier on him and he backed up Jack Ham and Andy Russell in 1973. The thought was that as Russell was long in the tooth that eventually Ham would move to the weak side (Russell's spot) and a rejuvenated Webster would take over the left side where he was dominant with the Oilers.

Well, it didn't work out that way. So, now Fairbanks had his left outside linebacker. Webster played well and even flashed some in 1974 looking better than he had anytime since his knee injury.

Ron Acks hung around long enough to be a camp body but was cut in September. The right outside linebacker job was earned by Steve King, a college standup end who was small (6-4, 215) and slow and undrafted but who worked his way into 232 pounds as a rookie backup and special teamer in 1973. King was by no means an All-star but he was solid, knowing his keys and responsibilities and with his newfound size, he was no weak sister.

Ray "Sugar Bear" Hamilton was moved to middle guard (nose tackle) where his height was an advantage and he'd put on weight so he then carried about 250-255 pounds on his 6-1 frame.  He was very quick and able to flummox centers.

Julius Adams moved to the right 5-technique on the right side (DE) and the left end was manned by Mel Lunsford a Raider cast-off Fairbanks picked up in 1973 where he was mostly on the taxi-squad or hurt. Adams played at a Pro Bowl level (he was All-AFC according to the New York Daily News). He totaled 86 tackles and 8 sacks but he used his low base to shed blockers and hold his point against the run as did Lunsford. Rick Cash was relegated to the WFL.

However, Fairbanks also added to the pass rush. He sent a 3rd round and 8th round pick to the Bears for Tony McGee. McGee had been a starter for the Bears but was not a complete player. Fairbanks knew that he'd need to go to a four-man line in passing downs and that Sam Hunt would not be able to cover or blitz well enough in those situations, so he needed a designated rusher and "Mac the Sack" McGee was that man.

In the secondary, he installed rookie Prentice McCray who the Lions unwisely cut to supplant  Ralph Anderson (who never again played in the NFL). One of the first moves Fairbanks had made was to acquire Jack Mildren (a former player of his in college) to play strong safety. Mildren was a fine college wishbone quarterback but had played only safety in the NFL, lacking arm strength to play quarterback.

But in playing for the Colts with players like Rick Volk and Jerry Logan and even a young Bruce Laird—solid tackling safeties (Mildren had played some corner and nickel in Baltimore as well) who were not going to let runner roam free in the secondary, Mildren learned that same style

The Patriots took the NFL by storm in the first half of the 1974 season, going 6-1 and having quality wins over the Dolphins, Rams, and Vikings. However, they failed to sustain it in the second half going 1-6 as turnovers and errors coast them several close games.

The run defense finished 4th in the NFL allowing just 1,527 yards and their yards per carry was third best at 3.4. In one year they chopped off 1,263 rushing yards  (for comparison the Rams allowed 1,270 total rushing yards in 1973) and reduced the yards per rush allowed from 5.1 to 3.4. They even upped their sacks from 32 to 38.

So, the 3-4 was a success. Sure, other teams had seen it before, it was not new but seeing it once in a while and not getting reps against it had to cause teams issues and the Patriots were the first NFL team to use it all season as their base.

It was so new that the press box statisticians didn't have the ability to show the correct lineups, listing linebackers as linemen for most of the season:

The Oilers tried to use the 3-4 full time but couldn't sustain it until mid-season when they acquired Curly Culp to play the nose. After that, they were a full-time 3-4 team. After the Oilers acquired Culp they finished the season going 6-2 and having a 7-7 record, same as the Patriots. If the Pats first half of 1974 could be matched with the second half of the Oilers you'd really have something.

As the 1970s moved on more and more teams adopted the 3-4 as a base defense until 1985 when 25 of the 28 teams used it:  the Bears (had the 46 defense), the Cowboys (the flex) and the Redskins (George Allen's defense) were the three holdouts before things swung back.

 When Jimmy Johnson's college 4-3 became popular in the mid-1990s things were totally reversed with only a few teams sticking with the 3-4, the Steelers and Panthers among them.

So the parallels of Fairbanks and Johnson are that of a defense they installed becoming popular and their knowledge of the college talent stocking their teams with players to fit their teams.

Building a Wall—Notable Improvements in Run Defense. Part III

DISCUSSION
By TJ Troup and John Turney

Troup on the 1957 Colts:
Baltimore won their first and last game of '56, but in-between went 3-7. The offense continued to improve, thus the defense is the culprit in the struggles of the Colts in '56, though some of the "pieces" to the puzzle are in place. Joe Campanella is replaced full-time by Jack Patera in 1957 and he is much improved as a full-time 4-3 middle linebacker in plugging inside gaps against the run. 

Rookie Don Shinnick wins the right outside linebacker job, and is outstanding in pursuit and tackling; a very bright future for this youngster. Since Bill Pellington breaks his arm he is replaced at left linebacker by Doug Eggers. He is serviceable, yet by no means a quality defender. 

Rookie Andy Nelson is a dramatic improvement over Jesse Thomas at left safety as both a pass defender and a run defender. "Bones" Nelson may be lean, but his inexperience is not an issue as he hustles with proper angles, and is a fine open field tackler. Bert Rechichar is still a savage aggressive hitter/tackler at right safety. Since the perimeter is improved; what about the D-line? 

Marchetti

Gino Marchetti demonstrated in '56 his ability to close down inside running lanes, and now in '57 becomes a strong factor defending the sweeps his side. He is fast becoming the premier left defensive end in football. Art Donovan is at his peak in '57. He closes down the trap, and no one can consistently drive block him out of the way. Don Joyce is strong at the point of attack at right defensive end due to his size and strength. Eugene Lipscomb improved during '56, but he still is replaced many times due to his very poor technique. 

Donovan

The '57 season is his coming out party; as the "Big Daddy" becomes the BIG DADDY! He is improved at shedding blocks, and though he had always hustled in pursuit----this year he takes better angles, and if there was a vote, he might have been the most improved player in the league. Film study shows him as a dominant performer who just needs polish and more experience. The first six games of '57 Baltimore allowed 340 rushing yards on 167 attempts, and though their record stood at 3-3 there is no doubt they are a factor in the western conference race. 

Lipscomb

The second half of the year the Colts allow 834 yards on 208 attempts. Rick Casares had a season for the ages in '56, and has had outstanding performances against Baltimore in the past, but on October 5th he gains just 19 yards on 12 carries in the Colt victory. Rookie wunderkind Willie Galimore gains just 9 yards on his 3 carries. Though Casares & Galimore combine to gain 123 yards on 34 carries in the Wrigley Field rematch, the Colts again are victorious. 

The young Colts have shown the Bears they are a team to reckon with defensively. Film study does show the weak link in the armor in the rematch loss with Detroit. The Lions gain 178 yards on sweeps, traps, and counter plays in knocking off the Colts to stay in the race. 

Baltimore in '56 allowed 1,916 yards rushing, but in '57 they stonewall the opposition as they allow just 1,174; an improvement of 742 yards. They cut the yards per rush from 4.3 to an amazing 3.1 per carry. The Colts are now serious contenders. 

Turney on the 1964 Dallas Cowboys.
In 1962 Bob Lilly went to the Pro Bowl as a left defensive end. In the mid-1990s Bob Lilly told us "To this day I couldn't tell you why". At the same time, Tom Landry told us "You could see his first couple of years Bob was kind of spinning his wheels outside".  And 1963 was when the change came.

At the beginning of the year, the Dallas ends were Lilly and George Andrie and the tackles were Guy Reese and John Meyers. The linebackers were Chuck Howley, Jerry Tubbs, and Dave Edwards.

Tubbs

And in the early part of the season, they all got roughed up on allowing over 230 yards rushing in the first two games and nut tons better after that. After going 1-6 Tom Landry benched his starting tackles and moved Bob Lilly to right tackle. Landry also swapped his safeties with Mike Gaechter moving to the right and Livingston the left.

The team improved marginally but overall for the year gave up 2,094 yards rushing and a 4.6 average and 12 rushing touchdowns. In 1964 they cut 590 yards off to 1,504 and the average carry went down to 3.4 and they cut the touchdowns in half.

How? The flex defense.

The flex is a coordinated "hold" or "read" defense as opposed to a Geroge Allen "attack defense". The Cowboys had a "penetrating defense" and a "blitzing defense" but used them when appropriate, passing downs or when they thought they needed it.

Landry wanted his defense to be disciplined and made sure every gap was filled, i.e. 'gap sound' defense. So, in 1964, with Lilly at right tackle and a full Summer camp to work on it, Dallas unveiled it. It wasn't an every down thing, however. Dick Nolan was still calling it a 'change-up' defense, but when the tight end was right (as it often was in those days) and the Cowboys called "Flex weak" it put Lilly off the line a yard and gave him a better pursuit angle for one thing, and it prevented what Landry called a "do-dad" block. 

Lilly

The do-dad where the guard would hit Lilly then release to a backer and another lineman (depending on play) would block Lilly. So, double teams on Lilly were reduced and he was freer to flow to the ball. And he did.

On passing downs, the Cowboys would use more tradition 4-3 alignments to rush the passer (attack or blitz packages).

Had there been a Defensive Player of the Year Award at the time, Lilly would have surely won it. (And don't call him Shirley). He had at 16 tackles for loss and seven sacks and was a dominating player reading when needed and when a penetrative defense was called, he was unblockable. Any film you see of the Dallas defense in 1964 Lilly will flash nearly every play.

Howley

Another change from 1963 to '64 was Lee Roy Jordan starting at Wanda (Will in most schemes' nomenclature) rather than Dave Edwards. Howley remained at Sara (Sam) and Tubbs excelled at Meg (Mike).

There were some changes in other personnel but the main reason for this improvement was the new scheme (the flex) and the perfect player (Lilly) for that scheme playing inside, where his talents were most suited. No longer was Lilly spinning his wheels.

We hope you've enjoyed TJ and JT's third installment. More to come.

Building a Wall—Notable Improvements in Run Defense. Part II

DISCUSSION
By TJ Troup and John Turney

The is the second discussion about teams that really built up their run defense after a previous poor season.

Troup on the 1956 Bears
The 1955 Bears forged their way into the western conference lead at 6-3 only to get demolished by the Cardinals as their cross-town rivals gained over 300 yards rushing. The Bears allowed 2,100 yards rushing in '55, but would certainly address this issue during 1956. 

It is strange that Clark Shaughnessy would start Wayne Hansen at middle linebacker, and Bill George at left linebacker for the first three games, yet the Bears still start 2-1. 

My book The Birth of the Modern 4-3 Defense details who played where during '56 for the Bears; thus this narrative is not only about personnel and the change that improved the defense, but the scheme used by Shaughnessy. 

Ken Gorgal, Jesse Castete, and J.D. Smith have been tried in the secondary, and none of them finish the year in Chicago. The return of Stan Wallace is paramount to the Bears run defense success. He is aligned almost always near the line of scrimmage, though he is listed as a safety. His size and tackling ability coupled with his pursuit angles and hustle are a dramatic improvement over the three previously mentioned men. 

Hall of Famer Bill George will go from stand up middle linebacker to a knuckles in the dirt defensive lineman in a 5-man line the opponent offensive line must adjust who to block. 

During the seven-game win streak (Wallace rejoins the team during the streak) opponents gained 935 rushing (133 a game). The per carry average of opponent runners is an impressive 5.0, but since the Bear offense led by Casares & Hill have almost always built a lead the per carry average is moot. 

Men like McElhenny and Perry of the 49ers have their moments as they have in the past (October 28th), but could not control the time of possession, and the Bears for the first time since 1950 beat San Francisco twice. 

Studying film of the November 18th clash in Wrigley against the Rams provided the following the analysis; the Bear defense finally did not allow the Rams to trap and sweep the Bears. Los Angeles beat the Bears five times from December of 1951 through the '55 season, and in those wins averaged 219 yards rushing a game. Chicago limited the Rams to 132 yards a game in the Bears four wins. 

The Rams gained 101 in the Chicago victory earlier in the season in the Coliseum, but today is slightly better giving up 100. Ronnie Waller zipped through the Bears for 42 yards earlier in the game, but in the 4th quarter, he cannot shake loose. Tank Younger also struggles as Los Angeles gains 4 yards rushing on six attempts in the 4th quarter. Behind and with the running game negated, Billy Wade must throw almost every down as the Bears again knock off their west coast rivals twice in a season.  

Was there an opponent who had success on the ground against Chicago? The Lions motored through the Bears for over 200 yards in early December as Hart on straight ahead power runs, and Gedman on sweeps punched out 145 yards as Detroit walloped the Bears. 

The rematch to end the season is a different story as the Detroit duo is stonewalled the entire game. Did Shaughnessy adjust? You betcha! The defensive ends crashed hard inside many times, while Bill George from his line position in the 5-2 or middle linebacker stacked behind a tackle in the 4-3 plugged the running lanes. 

Wallace with able assistance from the other safety McNeil Moore filled the cut back lanes and made Hansen & Joe Fortunato's job much easier. The last two games of the year the Cardinals and Lions gained only 138 yards rushing on 60 attempts. Bear opponents gained 1,483 yards rushing (an improvement of 617 yards) as Chicago won a division title for the first time in ten years. 

Turney on the 1971 Redskins:
In 1970 Washington allowed 2,068 rushing yards, a 4.4 average carry, and 19 rushing touchdowns. Allen wouldn't allow that to continue. In fact, Washington had given up similar numbers in 1968 and 1969 as well, so the issue was systemic as were other things. So, George Allen is hired by Redskin owner Jack Kent Cook.

George Allen liked players who had some experience as opposed to potential and athletic ability so he would often trade draft picks that hold the hope of the future for veterans, telling the Washington sports media that "The Future is Now". 

Allen had done that kind of thing with the Rams in 1966 when he was hired to be the head coach in Los Angeles. He inherited a great front four but he didn't like the linebackers and some of the secondary. So, he talked Jack Pardee out of a one-year retirement (he sat out 1965 due to a bout with cancer and he was tired of toiling for a losing team) and he traded for Bill George to run the defense. He also traded for Maxie Baughan and Myron Pottios to boost the linebacker play and they all did a good job.

In 1971 Allen found that Washington didn't have linebackers he liked with only a couple of exceptions, so he traded for Pardee, Pottios, and Baughan again. He'd likely have talked Bill George out of retirement if he could. He just never liked Marlin McKeever (he traded him away from the Rams in 1967) giving him the distinction of having been traded away by George Allen twice.

Regardless, Allen obviously thought McKeever was part of the problem in stopping the run in 1970.

Maxie Baughan, Myron Pottios, holdover Chris Hanburger, Jack Pardee

So, he got his linebackers and in that same trade, he acquired Diron Talbert who was coming off of a great year in 1970 with Allen's Rams with 61 tackles, 11 sacks and 10.5 run stuffs in 1970. Talbert was going to be his right tackle. He also traded for Ron McDole to play left end and sent a pick to the Jets for Verlon Biggs who was going to be his right end. 

McDole and Biggs were big players for that era, McDole was quick (his "Dancing Bear" name really did fit) and Biggs was strong but could rush the passer well. Both had played on excellent run defenses in the, as good or better than any in pro football. McDole's Bills allowed the fewest rushing yards in both the AFL and NFL from 1964-67. And the Jets, where Biggs was the right end, held that distinction from 1968, beating out teams like Landry's Cowboys and Allen's own Rams who were the top NFL teams in stopping the run in that period.

And both could also get pressure on the quarterback, Biggs especially. 

The 1970 players at the defensive end spots were John Hoffman and Bruce Anderson, both journeyman. The left defensive tackle was Floyd Peters was 34, but looked 44 and was ready to enter coaching. So they were all jettisoned in favor of the three new guys.

Diron Talbert, Verlon Biggs, Ron McDole

Allen's 1971 left tackle was Manny Sistrunk, a holdover from 1970 but who hadn't played much, and Bill Brundidge (another holdover) who would play on passing downs. Brundidge was a starter at right tackle in 1970 but he was part of the problem but he could get inside pressure and Allen liked that part of his game. So, left tackle was a platoon, the first run/pass platoon we know of in NFL history game (the 49ers did it a lot in 1970 but it was at end not tackle).

To round out the rushmen (Allen's term for defensive linemen) he traded for Jimmie Jones, a tall but thin defensive end with great quickness. Jones would play right end (sometimes left) in passing situations (he led the team in sacks with 7½ in his designated rusher role). Even though Biggs was a good rusher (15 sacks in 1967 and 14½ in 1973), Jones was better. He was a great takeoff, Allen compared him to a young Deacon Jones, so he got the pass-down snaps.

Jimmie Jones, the sack leader

Allen liked Washington's "dekes" his term for defensive backs. The corners remained the same Pat Fischer at left corner and Mike Bass on the right. He moved strong safety Brig Owens to free safety and acquire strong safety Richie Petitbon. For good measure, he sent a draft pick to the Chargers for return man Speedy Duncan who doubled as the nickel back.

So trader George used essentially six players on the line in rotation, four linebackers, and five defensive backs (15 regulars) and he traded for eight of them (Maxie Baughan didn't play, but rather helped coach the linebackers)—more than half.

Allen installed his scheme with was a rush the passer, look for the run on the way to the passer, but it was sound in that players were taught keys to the run that they could see in the first couple of steps. So they run was stopped with his scheme as it was in Chicago and in Los Angeles.

Washington proved they were able as well as they cut the rushing yards by 672, the yards per carry dropped from 4.4 to 3.4 and they reduced rushing touchdowns from 19 to seven.

In ten of the fourteen regular-season games they allowed 106 or fewer rushing yards and they only had one game that could be termed bad. It was against the Bears where they gave up 205 yards rushing. However, 88 of that was to quarterback Bobby Douglass (who almost scored helmetless) and then, late in the game, Cyril Pinder broked off a 40-yarder on a trap play. (after which the Bears converted an extra point to secure the upset on a play they botched and then saved with a throw from Douglass to Dick Butkus for the PAT)

But the run defense wasn't the only improvement. By reading the run quickly and stopping them for modest gains they put teams into passing situations and Washington improved the pass defense as well. Sacks were up from 24 to 36 and the defensive passer rating dropped from a poor 70.6 to an excellent 45.1. They cut the opponent completion percentage from 54.8 to 46.5 and almost doubled interceptions (from 15 to 29).

It was certainly Allen football for Washington in 1971. It was a combination of new players and scheme with an emphasis on effort, teamwork, and soundness on the defensive front. Added to which the special teams were great and the offense ran the ball well and worked play-action passing with another new player—Billy Kilmer. All of it added up to a playoff seasons for a team that had not had a winning season since 1955.

We hope you enjoyed Part II and say tuned for Part III of TJ and JT's discussion.