A Closer than Usual Look at Joe Klecko and Mark Gastineau's HOF Resumes

LOOKING AHEAD
By John Turney

Once again, we have no dog in this fight, just as we don't for other recent player-versus-player profiles we've done recently.

We read Joe Klecko's name quite often in online pieces about his worthiness for the Hall of Fame but rarely (if ever) read Mark Gastineau's name so we wanted to explore that a little bit.

As always we begin with a look at the stats and the honors—

Gastineau led the NFL in sacks for the 1980s when you include 1980 and 1981, the two years prior to sacks becoming official with 105½. And that is with retiring mid-season in 1988.

Klecko gets credit for being a Pro Bowler at three positions, defensive end, defensive tackle, and nose tackle. He was not All-Pro at all three, though you see that printed out there. It's one of those "True Lies" we find from time to time.

The only way to make that statement true is to say All-Pro and Pro Bowler are the same. They are not. All-Pro chooses the best from both conferences while Pro Bowl selections are defacto All-Conference teams, not All-NFL teams. Nonetheless, even going to the Pro Bowl at all three is impressive. So there is no incentive to shade it, it's great as it is—Klecko is the only player to go to Pro Bowl at three positions. As far as we know that is true.

However, the two All-Pros, one and end and one at the nose are the only two times he was All-Pro. Gastineau was First-team All-Pro four times and a Second-team All-Pro one more time.

Klecko was the 1981 UPI AFC Defensive Player of the Year and Gastineau was the NEA NFL Defensive Player of the Year in 1982 so that basically evens out. But then Gastineau won his own UPI AFC Defensive Player of the Year award in 1984 Both were major awards at the time and well respected. So, edge Gastineau.

The big knock on Gastineau was that he didn't play the run. And that's fair. Howie Long spoke about that a lot in the 1980s when he was trying to get "Gastineau money" from Al Davis. Long said the reason he didn't get the sacks Gastineau did was that he played all phases of the game and Gastineau didn't.

However, when Paul Zimmerman chose his 1983 Sports Illustrated All-Pro team he wrote, "The Jets' Mark Gastineau, the AFC's leading sacker, with 19, was a target for TV commentators this year. They were always telling you how he was overplaying the pass, at the expense of the run, but then their isolated camera would catch him stopping the ball carrier for a yard loss. Maybe Gastineau's techniques aren't perfect yet, but nobody hustled as much as he did—for a full afternoon. No, I don't go for the sack dance either, but give the guy credit. He played great this year."

Interestingly the numbers bear Dr. Z out. In 1983 Gastineau had 11.5 run stuffs, more than Klecko had in a single season. In fact, in 1981 he had 8.5 run stuffs which tied Klecko's career high and that was when Kelcko was inside, as a nose tackle in 1985. (For what it's worth that run stuff figure for Gastineau was more than any season Howie Long had as well).

However, beginning at mid-season in 1984 Gastineau's rep caught up with him and he, according to Zim, gave up trying to play the run to focus on sacks.

In 1985 when the Jets moved to a 3-4 and Klecko played the tilted nose in Bud Carson's stunt 3-4, Gastineau moved to the right end in the base defense, which was a change but he'd often move to his familiar left end in passing situations. In the Carson scheme it allowed Klecko to penetrate, it was not a classic 1970s/80s 3-4 where the nose was only asked to take on blocks. Carson recognized using Klecko in a one-gap penetrating way it would be difficult to block.

Carson was right, the Jets defense improved greatly versus the run in 1985 over 1984. All the Jets were seemingly poor versus the run in 1984 just as they were in 1983, the 11½ run stuffs for Gastineau notwithstanding. The sacks ticked up a bit, too. Klecko was dominant and Gastineau was close to that.

Here are the Jets run defense stats and sacks from 1977-88

Turning to Proscout, Inc. (PSI), the reliable scouting firm Dr. Z cribbed from for years (Merlin Olsen, too. When you heard great nuggets on NBC they were from PSI) we see mixed results for both players.

As a rookie Gastineau was ranked 47th (orange), then in 1980, he moved up to being a "red" player. In 1981 he was the top defensive end (high blue) in the NFL according to PSI with his 20 sacks and 8.5 stuffs. In 1982 he was still blue (though a hair lower) and in 1983 and 1984 he was again very high blue. In 1985, still blue, but lower in the rankings. He dropped dramatically in 1986 and 1987 but was red in the for the time he played in 1988.

Klecko also had great seasons with high marks. From 1978-80 he was red, playing 3-4 end in 1978, 4-3 tackle in 1970 and 4-3 end in 1980. In 1981 he was high blue, ranking 4th in the NFL among defensive ends. 1982 was a washout due to a terrible knee injury. In 1983 and 1984 he came back as a defensive tackle and was a low blue in 1983 and orange in 1984. With the move to nose in 1985, he was back to his usual self as a high blue (4th best nose) and in 1986 he was ninth (low blue).  The bottom fell out in 1987 and 1988 (with Colts) and he was orange in those years.

So, for those scoring at home, Gastineau was blue/single digits in rankings five times and Klecko achieved that status four times. And in terms of the rest of the grades, Gastineau scores higher.

In the next thing we track, testimonials, both score well. In 1981 Gannet News Service's Joel Buchsbaum wrote, about Klecko, "Had over 20 sacks and excelled against the run while playing on a bad foot". For Gastineau, the line was, "Rivals Klecko as a pass rusher and much improved versus the run". Joel even added a couple of years later, "Gastineau is the premier pass rusher in the NFL. He has a rare combination of speed, strength, and power and has become a force against the run".

Don Henrich's Pro Preview which availed itself of lots of scouting material said about Klecko, "Explosive, strong, and competitive he never stops coming on the pass rush. His aggressiveness is sometimes turned against him on traps and draws." They called Gastineau the "best power rusher in the league" and said he was recognizing run plays better but could also be taken advantage of on draws and traps". Going into 1983 PP said, "The explosive strongman led the league in sacks with 19 and has improved his play against the run. He was especially adept at stringing out the sweep last year. His enthusiasm still leaves him vulnerable sometimes versus the trap."

For Klecko they said, "(C)oming back from knee surgery was moved from end to tackle when it became apparent he'd lost some speed and lateral movement. Still quick and strong and relentless he benefitted from the move (inside)."

In other testimonials Klecko's are stellar. Dwight Stephenson considered him one of the two best interior linemen he had ever faced. Anthony Muñoz said, "Joe is right there at the top of the defensive ends I had to block . . . he was the strongest guy I ever faced. He had perfect technique—hands in tight, great leverage. . . he was such an intense, smart player"

Hall of Fame guard Joe DeLamielleure added that "You can’t think of his ten-year period without him. I had to block Joe Greene and Merlin Olsen when I was playing and, believe me, Joe Klecko was equal to those two guys."

For Gastineau, there may be some quotes we have not laid our hands on, but we've really only located a couple of tackles that listed him among their "top" opponents. One was Keith Dorney the other was Greg Koch. Good players, but not household names. Ron Yary, who faced Gastineau in 1979 said that Gastineau was the "fastest defensive end he ever faced" but added as a rookie, he was not yet a very good player, he was just fast.

In terms of intangibles, Klecko was a truly esteemed teammate for the Jet players. Gastineau was not. Often he was a dog on his own hunt, seeking outside of football deals and fame. Gastineau and his sack dance were seen as hot dogging at that time, and opponents and teammates resented it. Seemingly Gastineau didn't care.

Recently Gastineau told ESPN, ""I got a lot of s-s-s-s-sacks—and I got a lot of punishment for it. I can't say I felt bad about getting sacks. It could've been a lot better if I didn't have all the negative publicity, but you know what? Looking back on it, my career, I had a lot of ups and downs. There's been a lot of negative publicity on me."

Conversely, Klecko gets nothing but love from the Jet fan base and New York media. He gets lots of articles written about him on the official Jets website and plenty from the New York papers.

He's rightly called a leader and rather than walking away from the NFL in the middle of a season like Gastineau did. Klecko did it the right way, after the 1988 season. Klecko said at a news conference at the Colts' headquarters. "I really feel great about retiring. My time has passed. When I came in the league, and even four or five years ago, centers were 250 or 260 pounds. This year, I played against nine guys that were 290 pounds. It's time for us little guys to move aside."

Though both had brushes with the law (Klecko for perjury in an insurance fraud case) and Gastineau for assault and other issues and both admitted to the use of PEDs though Klecko said it wasn't for football but for the NFLPA for strong-man contests it seems Gastineau gets more negative press.

We don't have an issue with players using PEDs in that era, it was not against the rules and if all the records and Super Bowls that were affected by players using steroids and other drugs the era would be largely wiped out. So, color us skeptical on Klecko's qualification of the use of the juice. If he did it for football, fine. He's one of the hundreds. Or thousands. There may be teams that wouldn't have won Super Bowls without juice.

In the end, this analysis shows that of the two Klecko has much stronger testimonials. They are from opponents (which carry the most weight with us) and they are strong and definitive. Those, coupled with four blue seasons from PSI and being All-Pro at end and nose (and a Pro Bowler at tackle) really do make a strong Hall of Fame case.

But, Gastineau wins in the total honors (twice as many All-Pros and Defensive Player of the Year awards), more Pro Bowls and so on. His PSI grades are higher and more consistent and he had more 'high blue" and "blue" seasons

At his peak, he was the best pass rusher in the NFL in an era that was exploding in the passing game after the 1978 rule changes and his speed and strength helped break blocks of tackles who could use their hands more than ever before.

Also, fans and the media who didn't know should now have learned Gastineau's poor run defense was likely exaggerated. We don't claim that it was Curtis McGriff or anything, but the Jets poor run defense in 1983 and 1984 cannot all be laid at Gastineau's feet. Klecko and Lyons were there, too. And according to stats and reports, Gastineau was actually good versus the run at least in 1981-1983 and other reports suggest he was okay at times after that.

Our own film study (and we've seen and studied a lot) was that he was always a penetrator and when he made those stuffs it was based on great athleticism and hustle. But tackles could influence him to go to the wrong side of them and their 5- and 6-yard gains too often. Call him a "10" versus the pass and a "6" versus the run.

So, while no one will likely mention Gastineau in terms of the upcoming Centennial Class he, too, deserves a look. There is not much space in their credentials, in some ways Gastineau is clearly ahead and in a couple of areas, we think Klecko is ahead.

This one is too close to call.

Deep Dive into the Hall of Fame Credentials of Ken Riley and Lemar Parrish

LOOKING AHEAD
By John Turney

Though not scientific when we see advocacy pieces online for the Hall of Fame it seems longtime Bengal Ken Riley has more juice than fellow Bengal Lemar Parrish. We were told years ago that a writer called the Bengals front office to gain insight into the two and they were definitely steered toward Riley over Parrish.

This happens sometimes. There could one multiple HOF-worthy players on a team and the current regime plays favorites. We've confirmed that this is the general kind of thing that has happened more than once viz-a-vis Riley vs. Parrish.

The Bengals have every right to do so, and we get it. Riley spent his whole career with the Bengals and by all accounts is a great guy who was a fine coach in college after his playing career. Parrish, like many players, struggled with addiction for a time late in his career and just after, but then got clean and also became a college head coach.

Additionally, Riley was a great leader and never complained about his contract as far as we can find. Parrish did, in a big way. He felt he was a top cornerback and wanted to be paid as such and said so publicly. Parrish wanted $100,000 a year, which was more than double what the average NFL corner was making at the time and the Bengals were not about to pay that. Eventually, that led to the trade of Coy Bacon and Parrish to Washington.

In 1979 Parrish again went public and verbally blasted the Bengals leadership in the papers. That cannot help ingratiate one to the Bengals front office. Parrish said that he felt bad for players like Riley and old teammates like Vern Holland, "Shoot man, they are good players and they deserve more". Is that criticism a factor as to why the Bengals brass favors Riley? Unknown. But it's a fair question to ask and we'd love to get the answer to it.

But the real question we asked recently was the Hall of Fame lacking because either player is missing? Or is the advocacy we see for Riley a more parochial concern for Bengals fans? Or put more simply—who was the better NFL player?

Well, there are several measures we've identified (though there could be more) that usually come up when we read about the candidacy of a player. Often the All-Pro and Pro Bowl selections, the "honors" comes up in the first paragraph, if the player had substantial honors. Then, perhaps, statistics would come next. Sometimes team success ("rings") plays a big part if the player had one or two.

What we call "testimonials" or endorsements of opponents is also key information. We enjoy those especially if they are ahistorical (from the time the player was in the NFL or shortly after) as opposed to recent quotes that can be contrived or revisionist in nature.  We also prefer testimonials from opponents over a player's own coach or teammates.

Although they have some value too often we see things like this:

Or this:

So, we don't fault or criticize Dungy or Munoz for their advocacy. It's certainly noble to push for your teammates to be in the same fraternity you are in if you think they are worthy. It's just that these kinds of things are pretty easy to garner. You could find lots of teammates willing to speak up for buddies. It's human nature but we'd prefer they be discount to some degree and not used as unbiased information.

Lastly, there could be some intangibles, things that cannot be measured but anecdotally say something about a player's impact. Maybe it's leadership, maybe it's a legitimate "he changed the game" testimonial (but don't get us started on that oft-used cliche that is rarely true). Maybe it's toughness or courage. Just anything that is, well, not measurable.

So, in the case of these two, how do all those factors shake out?

First, look at their career stats—

The first thing we can see for comparison in terms of the postseason honors is the Pro Bowls. Parrish went to seven and Riley never went to one. Parrish also went to an eighth as a punt returner, but in terms of Pro Bowls, we think that should be called seven to zero, not eight to zero because one of Parrish's was really as a returner. 

Now the big caveat would be if there could have been mistakes in the Pro Bowl teams. Sure, were and still all. That is why we look at Pro Bowls but also look at All-Conference teams and then the All-Pros and so on. Pro Bowls are but one data point and nothing as weighty as the Hall of Fame should be decided on the basis of a single data point in our view.

Riley sure felt like there were mistakes and said so a couple of times in the mid-1970s and still does to this day, telling the National Football Post, "The system is all screwed up. A lot of times, there were guys who made the Pro Bowl based on what they did the previous year."

So, in terms of mistakes, let's assume that Riley should have gone to the Pro Bowl in 1975 and 1976, and let's put him in the place of Parrish for both seasons. That would make the Pro Bowl tally five to two. Let's even give him one in 1983 to make it closer, five to three. Would three be enough? Four? And that is going on the assumption that Riley would be the guy to replace Parrish. Others likely felt they were getting "snubbed" too, not just Riley.

Regardless, in the literature of the day, we found nothing to suggest Riley got snubbed in the 1977-80 seasons (or before). In the meantime, Parrish was rebounding from being nicked in 1977-78 to being a Pro Bowler with the Redskins. So even when he changed conferences, he was still voted by the players and coaches to the Pro Bowl. Perhaps the seven to zero tally in Pro Bowls is because Parrish was recognized by his peers, in real-time, as the better player and not some year-after-year oversight or snub or slight of Riley. 

Next, we look at First- or Second-team All-Pro selections it's five for Parrish to three for Riley. And in the highest honor First-team All-Pro it is three for Parrish to one for Riley.

So, in the "honors" standard it's pretty clear Parrish, in his time with Bengals and Redskins, was recognized as the better player among the coaches, players, and writers than was Riley. We all of them wrong?

Looking at statistics, namely interceptions, Ken Riley has a decent-sized advantage 65 picks to 47 for Parrish. On defensive scores, Parrish has seven and Riley five. Interceptions are tricky. They are, of course, a key play, and defensive coaches love them. Turnovers, especially those that give a team a quick touchdown, are huge in terms of wins and losses. 

The key thing you will read when cases are made for Riley is his rank in interceptions. It begs the question though, does that make him HOF worthy if his "honors" are light by Hall of Fame standards? Were teams throwing away from Parrish and therefore giving Riley more opportunities? Or, put another way.—Are interceptions alone enough for the Hall of Fame over Parrish or even other players who were more highly regarded at the time?

What also needs to be considered, at least looked at, in term of interceptions is when they came. For Riley, they did help his team—the Bengals, during Riley's time, had a winning percentage of .527 and in games Riley had a pick they had a winning percentage of .591 so it was a "plus" factor.

But when Parrish was with Cincy they had a winning percentage of .589 and when Lemar had an interception they had a winning percentage of .714—so Parrish was a much bigger "plus" factor in terms of winning when he made a pick. And to show it was no fluke that trend continued with Washington were in games that Parrish had a pick they won at a .625 clip and were and even .500 in Parrish's stint there (.458 in games with no pick). So, with fewer picks than Riley, his picks were much more impactful. 

Coach TJ Troup thinks that is some of what going on at the time. Troup thinks highly of both players but has said that of the two Parrish was the better all-around corner and in his film study teams avoided Parrish more than Riley when they played together.

But the bottom line on the statistics category is Riley had more interceptions and is fifth all-time and was second in the NFL in picks three times all fine credentials. Parrish with his 47 is oddly 47th all-time (ahead of Mike Haynes and Roger Wehrli among others) and was second in the NFL in picks once.

However, it does seem some (many) of his supporters the interceptions to be the single data point considered for his HOF candidacy and we'd disagree on the appropriateness of that. We think it should be a part, a major part even, of the 'resume'. But like with Pro Bowl, Riley's lack of Pro Bowls and All-Pros shouldn't nix his candidacy but the interceptions alone shouldn't put him over the top, either. Maybe many Riley backers will disagree, but to be fair to all players, you have to look are more than just stats and more than just honors, both things and more should be looked at. 

Moving to the "What they said about ..." phase we can review the objective grades of Proscout, Inc., the scouting firm founded in the mid-1970s that evaluates all aspects of all NFL players, they don't just "grade". They have their own set of criteria that goes into their evaluations and then give a report to the NFL teams that subscribe. 

Parrish was a "high blue" in 1976, 1977,  (we do not have pre-1976 grades) and a high red in 1978 and 1979, and low red in 1980. In 1981 he was 43rd and there is no rank for 1982.

In contrast, Riley's scores were much lower. He was low red in 1976-78. In 1979 he was high orange (blue is highest, then red, then orange) and he was orange through 1982 and bumped up to red in 1983. Even assuming 1975 would have been "blue" that would have been his only season as a top player. Whereas Parrish was 'tops' several times and if you add in pre-1976 stuff it again tips the scale far to Parrish's side.

One other data point is George Allen's grades for defensive backs in the 1970s. His scores go from 9 (highest) to 1 (lowest). In 1976, Ken Riley's best season, arguably anyway, he gave Riley a "6+", a very good grade, good for about 14th-17th in the NFL for that season. Parrish was a "9" which made him one of the top two. 

In 1973 (we only have data from 1973 and 1976) Parrish is graded by Allen as the third-best in the NFL with a 1.7 grade—the grading system for that season was 1.0 is the lowest (excellent), 2.0 (good), 3.0 (average), 4.0 (below average), 5.0 (poor) so the lower the score the better. He is in the same range as Mel Renfro, Lem Barney, Willie Brown, and the names you'd expect.

Riley has a score of 2.8 (between good and average) and is tied for 28th in the NFL among corners. 

Again it seems Parrish was scoring better by film graders. 

Did these evaluators like Mike Giddings and Geoge Allen have something against Riley? Of course mot. Allen's evaluations were internal and ProScout's evaluations were for his subscribers only. It's simply the case that like the players who voted for the Pro Bowl and the NEA All-Pro team and the writers who voted for the other All-Pro teams they thought Parrish was simply better than Riley.

It goes on.

About Parrish, Gannett News Service's Joel Buchsbaum wrote in 1979, "Superb pass defender with remarkable quickness and acceleration and agility but is not known for run support". Buchsbaum didn't write much about Riley due to the fact he only wrote blurbs about top-5 or top-10 corners. Perhaps he had data that he didn't publish in that era. (Oh, how I wonder what happened to his files after his tragic passing)

In 1981 Buchsbaum gave grades on all the Super Bowl XVI starters, both the Bengals and 49ers on a 1-5 scale: 5.0 was the best—a "gold nugget", a 4.0 was a "blue chip" player, a 3.0 was a "red chip", 2.0 was "average" and 1.0 was "poor". 

Riley was given a 2.5 grade, his teammate Louis Breedon was given a 3.0. The 49ers corners, for comparison, were rookies Ronnie Lott and Eric Wright whose grades were 3.5 and 2.5 respectively. It seems those grades fall in line with what the others we've mentioned were grading.

Don Heinrich's Pro Preview magazines were another of the truly great pieces of NFL literature in terms of giving really good and deeper-than-usual information on players. For Parrish, they simply echoed Buchsbaum—"excellent cover corner, not a hitter". 

For Riley, they said, "He gets by on strictly on smarts and savvy and can no longer run with the James Loftons or Jerry Butlers. As a result, he has to play soft and give up some short stuff. Still, his anticipation and reactions allow him to pick off passes." And "Riley is still a quality corner. Alert and smart with great anticipation". Sounds fair.

Additionally, in that era, there was a yearly column of what amounted to Pro Bowl "snubs" done by the Bergen Record's Vinny DiTrani that listed players who should have made the Pro Bowl or All-Pro team but didn't for whatever reasons. These days columns like that are common but then DiTrani's was one of the few (along with Buchsbaum's). In reviewing all of those, Riley was never mentioned. So not only was he not making Pro bowls, he wasn't making many (or any) "snub" articles, either. 

In all honesty, in the late 1970s-early 1980s you didn't find Ken Riley's names on "top" lists and you did find Parrish's. There are simply no data points that show anything but Parrish being more highly rated than Riley.

In other testimonials, we find a couple but both are from less than unbiased sources— "Fred O' Conner, his defensive backs coach with the Redskins, "I cannot imagine how good the corner would be who is better than Lamar. He's as good as any who ever played the game." Jack Pardee said, "Lemar occupies a lonely island every week". 

Riley’s teammate, defensive end Ken Johnson. “He (Parrish) was probably one of the best cornerbacks in the league in terms of his durability and his ability to read offenses and kind of know what was coming at him.”

In a pregame article in 1973, prior to a Bengals-Viking game, Bud Grant singled out Lemar Parrish as "one of the best in the game" and mentioned Bill Bergey and Mike Reid but no mention of  Riley. After a while, one has to ask why this happens—Parrish getting more praise than Riley. 

Of course, there could be some testimonials we have not located espousing the all-time greatness of these two corners but so far, the edge is again with Parrish.

In the category we call "intangibles" it could perhaps be called in favor of Parrish in terms of special teams because he was a fine punt returner, and as we mentioned he was the AFC punt returner for the Pro Bowl in 1970. But Riley is not blown out in this category, he blocked three kicks early in his career. He wasn't as successful a kick blocker as say Gary Green or Pat Thomas or some other of the era, but he was someone you had to make sure was blocked or he'd ruin your kicking game for the day.

Riley's longevity does edge Parrish, fifteen seasons to thirteen but while that used to be a big deal, seemingly, for the HOF committee it seems less important these days with players like Terrell Davis and Ken Easley and Robert Brazile getting in and Tony Boselli likely to get in soon. Nonetheless, Riley did play longer.

In a way, this comparison we chose reminds us of the Carl Eller-Jim Marshall situation when both were in the Final 15 around fifteen years ago. Both were great, both had good resumes but any objective analysis would conclude that Eller's resume was superior to Marshall's. Marshall had three consecutive game streak and the longevity (twenty seasons) but Eller was All-Pro multiple times, Marshall none.

Eller went to six Pro Bowls and Marshall had two. Even if one did the same thing concerning the Pro Bowls we did with Parrish and Riley (give Marshall a couple extra) it's really not that close. Eller averaged 8½ sacks a season and Marshall about 6½ and that was known at the time, perhaps it wasn't earlier.

As a result, the voters chose Eller over Marshall that year, and in our view, rightly so. Nothing against Marshall and nothing against Riley (we're not worthy to hold the jock of either one) but we feel the obligation for voters is to put the best possible players in first and it perhaps means looking at more than just stats, it means looking at credentials in total. We'd sure be sad if some poor deceased five-time All-Pro who played prior to World War II didn't get in the Hall of Fame in the 2020 Centennial Class and  players with one or no All-Pros who did get in.

So, we don't know who might get in the Hall of Fame we saw a post about Riley possibly being among the favorites for the Centennial Class and Parrish was not mentioned. So we chose to do the compare and contrast post you are now reading about those two. It could have been a couple others mentioned.

Again, if Riley (or Marshall for that matter) gets in the HOF we'd be happy for them personally, there have been lesser resumes elected. We would, however, in our capacity as fans who evaluates these kinds of things, know that he got in because of just one thing—his picks. 

And we'd think the same for Marshall who was an amazing, incredible iron man but not a really productive player for all of his twenty seasons. He was great in 1969 and good in a couple of other years but "just a guy" all too often. We hope the standards stay high and there are some great players that would fill that bill.

We will read your comments below:

True Lies

PERSPECTIVE
By John Turney

Can information that is accurate be misleading and give false impressions to those it is communicated to? 

Years ago I knew a United States Congressman and when he ran he touted that he was ex-military and that he'd been a pilot. However, in some meetings I attended and on his website, it was announced that he was a "Viet Nam era pilot". Still, to me, no problem.

Then after he'd been elected and there was a fervor among some veterans groups about public people, usually politicians were puffing up their military careers. Giving themselves credit or credentials they had not earned. This congressman ended up, along with many others, on a "Stolen Valor" list on a website that purported to track such things

Concerned, I called the congressional office to get clarification. And they reported to me that the congressman never claimed to be a Viet Nam pilot, only that he'd been a pilot in the Air Force in the "Viet Nam era". Apparently, he'd ferried jets around from base to base. Of course, this is 100% honorable service, and necessary and needed. If someone was in the military and was a cook or any rear echelon person it's honorable service and I salute them.

However, for the group that was outing people they accused of "stealing valor" (puffing of military resume) it was a problem because while true, his website left the casual reader (and I was one of them) with the impression that he served in Viet Nam. So, the words were 100% accurate but was it deception? 

The only fair answer is yes.

Recently, I got into a long debate with some Raiders fans who desperately want Tom Flores in the Hall of Fame. And they had several talking points or "nuggets" as I call them about Flores' career. All the nuggets were true and most were very helpful and captured Flores' great accomplishments.

However, one of the nuggets was the fact that Flores, along with Mike Ditka, were the only two people ever to have a Super Bowl ring as a player, assistant coach, and head coach.

That was the nugget I have an issue with. While it's not the backbone of the case for Tom Flores for the HOF (his two rings as a head coach is that) it's one of those true lies. It was presented as a bullet point or talking point as to the main reasons why Flores should be in the Hall of Fame. They gave maybe three or four reasons and that was one of them.

What the defenders of this nugget refused to accept that when you put that kind of thing out there it casts doubt on the rest of the information. It flirts with falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus or "false in one thing, false in everything" which can even be a jury instruction in our court system. It simply means it's reasonable for a juror or person to not believe anything a witness says if they think he's inaccurate about one thing. And if the jury of the HOF committee were to adopt that it could actually hurt Flores. I think they are smart enough to see that and dismiss it but you never know. Flores is worthy of the Hall of Fame but his case shouldn't be augmented on things that are misleading, in my view.

My thoughts in the debate were that it would be better to leave that out because while true, it carries no real meaning because Flores' Super Bowl ring as a player was in 1969 when he was acquired at midseason by the Kansas City Chiefs because they had injury issues at quarterback. Len Dawson was hurt, Mike Livingston was filling in so they needed a backup. Flores barely played in 1969. He was essentially third string for the Chiefs. He threw one pass. That hardly fits the meaning of an NFL quarterback "winning a ring".

"Winning a ring" is a phrase that has meaning. It denotes that the player contributed to the ring, especially as a quarterback. While accurate no one says Marc Wilson won two rings. They rightly say Jim Plunkett won two rings. Both are true, but one would not fit the actual meaning of the phrase.

In 2004 some in the media were trying to tout Steve Young as having three "rings". Well, yeah. But, no. No sale. Sports Broadcaster Jim Rome used to call the rings we are talking about (Flores, Young, Wilson) gravy-train rings. The only exceptions would be when a backup actually took over and drove the team home to ultimate victories like a Plunkett or a Jeff Hostetler or a Nick Foles.

As an aside, I don't think using Flores' playing career in any way enhances his HOF resume. He's being considered as a head coach, not some sort of combination candidate. His excellence was taking a Wild Card team all the way and then winning a second Super Bowl three years later.

Why would being a decent quarterback in the AFL help a HOF case? Did Don Shula's playing career help him one whit? Shula was a serviceable defensive back. Chuck Noll was a pretty good lineman. Tom Landry was a really good defensive back. All irrelevant. They are HOFers as coaches, nothing else.

Oddly, there are some things the 1980-86 Raiders did that were interesting and if articulated they would actually enhance his case in my view. These are football things, i.e. schemes and packages that they did that were unique and special. As the head coach, he would get credit for letting his coaches do them. But sadly, I've not seen one word written about them.

This is not the only time there have been misleading things presented to make cases for Hall of Famers. In the case of the Flores nugget, I don't think it was coming from HOF voter(s). However, when Fred Dean was being presented it was expressed that he was an "innovator" and his innovation was that he invented or was the first player to be a third-down rusher or designated rusher. This information was communicated to me on a couple of occasions by Hall of Fame voters.

This information was accurate. 

It was not malicious nor do I think the nuggets about Flores are somehow evil, it's not it's just deceptive. I think it's simply well-meaning people trying to achieve something and using all the things they can to get it done.

Back to Dean. Dean, in 1981 was not the first guy to come in and rush on passing downs. In earnest, it began in 1970 with Cedrick Hardman, though Paul Zimmerman once told me that Larry Cole may have done a little of it as a rookie. The Rams used it in 1969 when Roger Brown was nicked up and needed to be spelled, But Hardman was the first to do it for most of the season. There were other milestones in the next decade.

In 1971 Jimmie Jones who played for George Allen in Washington was the first to lead a team in sacks from that role. Harvey Martin was first to make the team in that specific role. In 1977 Pat Toomay was first to lead a conference (AFC) in sacks when he was the designated rusher for the Raiders. In 1980 Cedrick Hardman, now with Oakland, was the first player in that role to win a Super Bowl ring.

None of that takes anything away from Dean who was the first designated rusher to win a Player of the Year Awad, he was the UPI Defensive Player of the Year in 1981 and he was the first to be named All-Pro and to go to the Pro Bowl—all great milestones. But he didn't innovate his position with the 49ers. It could be argued he perfected it and in that part of it, he earned his HOF ring—being better than the rest. Was Dean a dominant rusher? Absolutely. Was he innovative in his position? No.

With the Pro Football Hall of Fame Centennial Class of 2020, there will be two coaches included. We would love to see Tom Flores be one of those two. We'd predict it, in fact, along with Don Coryell simply based on how close those two have been in the regular process in the last few years.

However, if the Committee chose Jimmy Johnson or some of the other two Super Bowl-win coaches or even Mike Holmgren or someone else, we'd have no issue. I have posted my thoughts on the coaches a few times. My take is simply that either all the two-win coaches should get in or none of them. I simply cannot separate them.

If Flores, with his being a pioneer as the first Latino coach to win the Super Bowl, is first then wonderful. He deserves it. Friends of mine who worked for the Raiders in the 1980s will be happy for him and I will be happy for them. I have never heard a negative word about the man. However, if he's not one of the two and the two that are chosen are worthy then I'd have no issue with that.

The issue is if I read before or after his election (which is inevitable in my opinion) that among Flores' HOF bona fides is that he is one of two people who have a ring as a player, assistant coach, and head coach then I will simply laugh because someone doesn't know the difference between the literal meaning of a phrase and the actual meaning of that phrase and that is a definition of irony. And the irony is usually funny.

This post was edited on 1/21/2003

The Rebirth of the Shotgun Offense

By Joe Zagorski

In 1974, the Dallas Cowboys had experienced their first non-playoff season for the first time since 1965. That result presented the team and their coaching staff with a dilemma of sorts. Their offense did not have a superior running game, and their passing game, though good, was not exactly striking fear in the hearts of opposing defenses across the league. They had a pretty good offensive line, and their starting quarterback—Roger Staubach—was considered by most experts and fans across the nation as one of the best quarterbacks in the NFL. But how was their offense going to make amends to missing the playoffs in 1975?

Dallas head coach Tom Landry came up with an answer to that question in 1975, and his decision back then would change the look of pro football offenses for generations to come.  It was called for posterity the “Shotgun Formation.”  Landry instructed Staubach to set up five to seven yards behind center on long yardage situations (usually on third downs, when more than five yards were required to move the sticks). The idea was not new, as former pro coach Red Hickey (and others) were the first to utilize this strategy, way back in 1960. But the idea was reborn by Landry more out of common sense than anything else.

“I’ve always felt that it was a little foolish to stay under center when everyone knows you’re going to pass,” said Landry, who always referred to the shotgun formation as the spread formation.  “Meantime, they (the opposing defenses) are putting in special defenses to stop the pass.”

Landry added several flourishing additions to the traditional shotgun offense that the Houston Oilers employed during the 1970 season, then their starting quarterback (Charley Johnson) took most of his snaps eight yards behind center. Johnson had suffered a shoulder separation early in the season, but he was Houston’s only hope for producing a competitive season. To keep playing, Johnson wore shoulder pads much larger than what he usually wore, and both he and Oilers head coach Wally Lemm hoped and prayed that the ball would be thrown before a charging defensive lineman could penetrate too far into the passing pocket. 

Landry’s implementations for the shotgun (er, spread), included using his running backs on sneaky little shovel passes from Staubach -- in addition to longer throws downfield to wide receivers like Drew Pearson, Golden Richards, and tight ends Billy Joe DuPree and Jean Fugett.  Landry’s modernizations of the shotgun added greatly to the unpredictability of the Dallas offense.  It also helped Staubach’s completion percentage go up, and that was added to the accepted threat of dealing with Staubach running with the ball himself.

“I think a mobile quarterback is an asset,” Landry admitted.  “If you don’t have that outlet to run or move quickly, then you’ll get a lot of (quarterback) traps and your percentage of completions will go down.”

Staubach and the rest of the Cowboys offense experienced immediate positive results with their new passing strategy. They surprised the Los Angeles Rams with an 18-7 win on opening day. Later in the season, Staubach was able to utilize the shotgun at Philadelphia to connect with Drew Pearson on a touchdown late in the fourth quarter, and again on a key sideline pass with just a handful of seconds remaining, which set up the winning field goal as time expired. That extra time in his passing pocket was most beneficial to Staubach, and to Dallas as a whole.

“I see much better from it,” said Staubach. “I can scramble better. I don’t feel surrounded.”
While many opposing defenses derided the Dallas shotgun as nothing more than a gimmick, they were also faced with trying to devise a strategy to stop it. Some defenses might have good pass rushing personnel, which could put at least some semblance of pressure on Staubach.  Other defenses would concentrate on giving tighter coverage to Staubach’s receivers. Regardless of what tactics that Dallas’ foes used to counter the shotgun attack, the Cowboys still managed to increase their completion percentage, their first downs through the air, and their passing touchdowns in 1975. One statistic that Dallas had fewer of, thanks largely to the shotgun, was sacks permitted.

As the 1975 regular season wore on, Landry, Staubach and Company were getting more familiar with the shotgun and more comfortable in using it on more situations, even when they were not expected to throw the ball. The success of the shotgun offense eventually helped to pave the way to important Dallas victories over New England, Washington, and the New York Jets, and to a Wild Card berth in the NFC playoffs.

The Cowboys would enter their contest at Minnesota in the divisional playoffs as a decided underdog. Despite dominating the Vikings in virtually every statistical category, Dallas trailed 14-10 with less than a minute to play.  Deep inside their own territory, Staubach employed the shotgun for two deep passes. The first was on a 4th and 16 situation, and it resulted in a clutch catch by Drew Pearson along the sideline for a crucial first down.  The second was destined to become one of the greatest plays in pro football history.

From midfield and with only 32 seconds left on the clock, Staubach reared back from his shotgun stance and heaved the ball deep for Pearson once again.  Miraculously, the original Hail Mary Pass nestled against Pearson’s hip as he strode into the Minnesota end zone. The Cowboys upset the Vikings, 17-14, and the shotgun offense claimed what was probably its most famous episode.

The next week in the NFC Championship Game, the host Los Angeles Rams were smarting for a revenge victory over Dallas. Remember, the Cowboys had upended the Rams in the 1975 season opener. In the NFC Title Game, however, the Rams simply could not contend with the Dallas Doomsday defense, a unit which played its best game of the year. The shotgun also experienced a wealth of success against the Rams defense. Staubach threw four touchdown passes in the 37-7 massacre.  Dallas was now a Cinderella team that was headed for Super Bowl X and a matchup against the defending world champs, the Pittsburgh Steelers. 

Pittsburgh’s Steel Curtain defense had two weeks to prepare for the shotgun, and they made the best use of that study time. The Steelers had the defensive personnel to sack Staubach seven times in the game (a Super Bowl record at that time), and to cover (and eventually hammer) the Dallas receivers during most of the game. Pittsburgh prevailed, 21-17, but given how far the Cowboys had traveled -- from failure in 1974 to a Super Bowl berth in 1975—there could be no denying that the shotgun offense was a huge success.

“What we were trying to do was twofold,” explained Landry.  “(First)…spread the defense and give our quarterback a little more time to read the coverage.  He picks up a half a second or more when he’s back five yards from center. And (second), he sees so much better. He can read defenses in a hurry.”

Today, every NFL team and most college teams employ some sort of shotgun plays in their respective offenses, lending even further credence to the importance of using the tactic. Many offenses today use it as their primary offensive formation.

The rebirth of the shotgun offense was just one of many reasons why Tom Landry was enshrined in the Pro Football Hall of Fame in 1990.

(Pro Football Journal Note: Pro Football author and historian Joe Zagorski has two upcoming books that will soon hit the market. The Year the Packers Came Back: Green Bay’s 1972 Resurgence (McFarland and Company, Inc., publishers), and America’s Trailblazing Middle Linebacker: The Story of NFL Hall of Famer Willie Lanier (Rowman & Littlefield, publishers), will both be available on the Amazon website).

Sources:
Bennett, Tom.  The Pro Style: The Complete Guide to Understanding National Football League
Strategy.  Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976.

Luksa, Frank.  “Is the Dallas Shotgun a Rinky-Dink Offense?”  Football Digest, October 1976,
20-26.

Neft, David S. and Cohen, Richard M.  The Sports Encyclopedia Edition 6, Pro Football the Modern Era, 1960-1988.  New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988.

Zagorski, Joe.  The NFL in the 1970s: Pro Football’s Most Important Decade.  Jefferson, North
Carolina: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2016.

Big Challenges Ahead for the Pro Football Hall of Fame Selection Committee

LOOKING AHEAD
By John Turney

This week the Pro Football Hall of Fame announced they are going to expand the Class of 2020 to uo to twenty players. The breakdown, as announced, is as follows:  Five modern-era candidates, ten senior candidates, three contributors, and two coaches.

The five modern candidates will be business as usual. There will be a final fifteen and up to five will be part of the 2020 class.

The senior committee usually picks one or two (depending on the year) candidates. For the NFL's 100th Anniversary there will be ten selected.

The contributor committee was slated to pick one this year will get to choose three. And There will be a set aside for coaches, totaling two.

Starting with the coaches we would say, of course, things can change but in recent years Tom Flores and Don Coryell have come closest to making the Hall but have been aced out by players. Jimmy Johnson has gotten some traction, too.

Other two-ring coaches Mike Shanahan and George Seifert have gotten nowhere. Seifert's second act with the Panthers was not pretty and he shares that trait with Flores who was not good in Seattle after his success with the Raiders.

Our guess is that Flores and Coryell will be the two and both are deserving but even though their fans won't admit it, neither were shoo-in, first ballot types. They may simply be the best of those waiting. It is our view their positives outweigh the negatives, but that both had to wait, it's sad, but if the Hall of Fame is to have high standards then the committee, as a whole, has every duty to examine the great things a player or coach did and also look at any possible warts. Every great player has them, and it's best to just be honest about them and discuss them.

As for contributors, we'd guess George Young will be one. The other two? Art McNally name seems to come up in Google searches. We'd chose Steve Sabol as one. An interesting candidate we'd support would be Elias Sports Bureau's Seymour Siwoff. He's the father of all metrics. His company, Elias, is the foundation of anything you see as it concerns statistics. If you are coming up with your own formulas based on statistics you find on the Internet, thank Seymour. He was the beginning of the standardization and the expansion of "the numbers". We've nominated him but he gets no traction. 

The ten seniors are where the committee will struggle the most. Though it sounds like a lot of nominees (ten) it's not. You could fill up have the slots with wide receivers. Or offensive linemen.

We hope they will use some of the slots for pre-WWII players. Our favorites are Al Wistert, Ox Emerson, Lavvie Dilweg, Duke Slater, and Verne Lewellen. And we could easily name five more from that era. We are content to let the collective wisdom of the committee sort that out.

If there are 4-6 more modern players, call it 1950s-1980s, there are plenty of contenders there. For some reason, fans care more about the skill positions than other spots. We could think of ten linemen and linebackers that are Hall-worthy that exceed the careers of all the possible skill players. But the committee always seems to balance it out and the linemen and linebackers (non-edge rusher 'backers) get shorted. It's just the nature of the beast.

The names we hear most often for Hall of Fame at the receiver position (speaking of skill positions) are Drew Pearson, Otis Taylor, Cliff Branch. We will look at them now, along with Harold Jackson and Del Shofner—some of the overlooked from the 1960s,70s, and 80s.

We put Lynn Swann's numbers first because any time and by that we mean EVERY time someone touts their favorite wide receiver who is getting "snubbed" they scream "LOOK AT SWANN'S NUMBERS COMPARED TO MY GUY".

It gets old. But it's a reality. We sho their catches per sixteen games and per 16 games in seasons they were a starter.

Swann has four rings, three as a starter, one as a backup and solid punt returner (1974). From 1979-81 he was hampered by various injuries. But according to one pro scouting service he was still a top player in 1979 and 1980 which is the equivalent of being All-Pro or at least Pro Bowl level. His skill set was as good, according to their "looks" as he was from in 1975, 77-78 when he was also blue.

Note" PSI began scoring in 1976 and rated top players in 1975 though the company was not yet formulated.

Those five "blue" seasons are part of what Swann's advocates spoke about when they were pushing for Swann's election in the 1990s. Paul Zimmerman was the leader in that push, always saying "Quality over quantity".

So, some may disagree with Swann being in but they sure use his relative lack of stats to propel "their guys".

Branch has three rings. He was All-Pro four times and went to four Pro Bowls. After that, he was more of a very solid contributor than the superstar he was from 1974-76.

Branch, like Swann, scored blue on PSI scale in 1975-77 (no score from 1974 but likely "blue" that year) and also 1979 and 1980. He was "red" or "low-red" in 1982 and 1983 as well.  "Red" is the next highest grade, not quite All-Pro but a player you can win with.  In 1978, 81, 84 he didn't fare as well.

Pearson has one ring and was All-Decade. From 1074-77 he got postseason honors every year including three All-Pro seasons. In 1979 he was Pro Bowl worthy but was just an alternate that year. The numbers show it was a solid year.

Turning to the scouting grades of PSI Pearson was looked on favorably. PSI didn't have a grade for 1974 and in 1975 he was high but that was the year before PSI began in earnest. He was blue in 1976, red in 1977. He was then blue in 1978, red in 1979, blue in 1980. From 1981-83 he was solid but not spectacular but rating higher than Cliff Branch every season.

Taylor has one ring. Looks wonderful on film. We'd say he got postseason honors in all of his good years—1966, 1967, 1971, 1971.

All of Taylor's career was pre-PSI but four seasons sure look good. The rest seem average. On film, he looks great. We at PFJ have been able to see a lot of AFL games and Taylor is certainly wide receiver eye candy. But so was Lionel Taylor and Charley Hennigan.

A while back I though Lionel Taylor may not be too fast because he had a low yards per catch average. I was looking just at stats. And he was in photos he had a slightly stocky build (for a wide receiver). But seeing him on film he had good speed and great moves and excellent hands. Much more athletic than I thought. Hennigan was speed. He ran very, very well. A poor man's Del Shofner in a way.

So, the question is if Otis Taylor becomes the 10th Chief (including owner and coach) to make the Hall of Fame. This is a team that dominated the AFL, but all told, won but one world title. They are not the 1960s Packers or 1970s Steelers or 1980s 49ers or even 1990s Cowboys or the 2000-2018 Patriots. Will his "scouting report accolades" surpass his production. Will the "he was the prototype big WR, the kind of guy that teams look for now" type of declarations carry enough weight to dispell the four great years and maybe six-seven so-so years? Unknown.

However, we see his name a lot on chat boards, Facebook and Twitter so he has some momentum. How much of that support is pro-Chief partisanship is hard to tell.

From 1969-81 Jackson led the NFL in receptions, yards, touchdowns and was fifth in yards per catch. That also includes 1970-79. Yet, he got no traction for All-Decade. If you like numbers, he's one of the kings of the NFL's dead-ball era (roughly 1970-77).

Jackson was not highly rated by PSI in 1976 or 1980 but he was 'blue' in 1977, 1978 and red 1979. We think 1969, 1972 and 1973 would have likely been blue.

Shofner's numbers in seasons he was a starter (1958, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65) are amazing. In 1960 the Rams, for some reason thought he should play defensive back. He was a starting defensive back in 1957 as well, and he was a good one according to T.J. Troup's film study. In 1966 and 1967 he was hurt most of the time.

He was also All-Decade for the 1960s and a five-time consensus All-Pro.

All of his years were pre-PSI. However, T.J. Troup's observations of Shofner show that while Bob Hayes got credit for changing the game it should have been Shofner who got that distinction as it relates to how zone defenses were used.

Troup will explain that zone defenses existed in the 1950s and usually, they would roll the zone to the strong side of the formation. But, when there was a speed demon on the split end side (away from the tight end) teams would roll the coverage to the weak side to give that weak cornerback some deep help. It happened with players like Harlon Hill, according to Troup but not in tremendous numbers. It was with Shofner and his terrific speed that teams began to do that with regularity.

It's true teams did it with Bob Hayes and did it a lot, but they did it with Shofner before Hayes was in the NFL. Hayes was faster than Shofner (and everyone else) but Shofner was extremely fast as well.

Will he ever be recognized for it? Unknown.

Speedie was dominant in the AAFC and did very well in NFL and then was a CFL All-Star after bolting to the CFL. He's had chances before and the writers of the 1960s and 1970s didn't reward him like they did Dante Lavelli the Browns other fine end. Speedie's name gets mentioned by some members of the Pro Football Researchers Association and some HOF voters. 

One has to ask if his numbers plus his five rings are enough to justify another Brown of that era. They have good representation as it is. That could factor in to some degree.

In upcoming weeks we will look at other positions. We do this to show how hard it is to separate great players. Who is the most worthy of these wide receivers? Hard to say. If you had to choose one, and only one who would it be?

And if you had to exclude the receiver who may have played for your favorite team who then would you select?

Stats LLC's "Marshall Faulk Number"

LOOKING BACK
By John Turney

Just under twenty years ago Stats, LLC (then Stats, Inc and now is STATS and purports to be "STATS is the world's leading sports data and technology company") published preseason books reviewing the previous NFL seasons. Often they'd list new and innovative stats or would simply make observations on unique players or teams.

One of those things was called the "Marshall Faulk number". It was a metric meant to measure running backs who run the ball well and caught the ball well, at least closer in yardage than average backs. They'd take the rushing yards and the receiving yards and compute a harmonic mean.

According to Wikipedia—The harmonic mean can be expressed as the reciprocal of the arithmetic mean of the reciprocals of the given set of observations. As a simple example, the harmonic mean of 1, 4, and 4 is

${\displaystyle \left({\frac {1^{-1}+4^{-1}+4^{-1}}{3}}\right)^{-1}={\frac {3}{{\frac {1}{1}}+{\frac {1}{4}}+{\frac {1}{4}}}}={\frac {3}{1.5}}=2\,.}$

Essentially it means that Stats, LLC. thought it better expressed the average between the rushing and receiving numbers rather than a simple mean—taking the two numbers and dividing by two.

Well, they began that in 1999 if memory serves and today we will update it. However, we did it by average rushing/receiving yards per game, not the season totals so it will better include players from the 14- and 12-game seasons.

Faulk dominates the top six but other great names are listed including Lenny Moore, Chuck Foreman, and others.

Here are all the players who averaged (harmonic mean) 58.0 yards per game.

Nick Buoniconti—RIP

By John Turney

Credit: Gary Thomas

Nick Buoniconti died on Tuesday, July 30, 2019. He was 78. He was an All-American at the University of Notre Dame, he was the middle linebacker for the “No-Name Defense” that went to three straight Super Bowls, winning two.

He was drafted by the Patriots in the 13th round of the 1962 AFL Draft and played for then Boston Patriots and beginning in 1970 the Dolphins, winning All-AFL honors seven times (five consensus) times in a 14-year pro football career.

Partial Career Stats—

Honors

1962— Second-team All-AFL

1963— First-team All-AFL; AFL All-Star Game (de facto Pro Bowl)

1964— Consensus All-AFL; AFL All-Star Game (de facto Pro Bowl)

1965— Consensus All-AFL; AFL All-Star Game (de facto Pro Bowl)

1966— Consensus All-AFL; AFL All-Star Game (de facto Pro Bowl)

1967— Consensus All-AFL; AFL All-Star Game (de facto Pro Bowl)

1968— First-team All-AFL 

1969— Consensus All-AFL; AFL All-Star Game (de facto Pro Bowl)

1972— Second-team All-NFL; Pro Bowl

1973—Second-team All-AFC; Pro Bowl